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REPORT ON GUARANTEES COVERED BY THE GENERAL BUDGET 
SITUATION AT 30 JUNE 1994 
This report describes the situation as regards budget guarantees at 30 June 1994. 
It is in response to the statement made by _the  Comffiission,  when the vote,  was taken on . 
supplementary  and  amending  budget  No 1/91,  that  it  would  repoit· to the budgt:tary. 
authority twice a year on budget guarantees and the corresponding risks.  -
The Commission has already-presented six reports to the budgetary_ authority: 
The report is in three parts: 
.  . 
1.  - Descriptio~ of  operations entered in the bu4get and events since the last report. 
2.  Situation  at  30 June 1994  as  regards  risks  for  the· budget  in  ~ture years  and 
guarantees'  at'r~ady activated. 
3  ~  Assessment of the economic and  financial  situation of non-Community countries .. · 
benefiting from the most important operations. ~ 3-
~  . 
.  PART--ONE:·~  OPERATIONS ALREADY ENTERED.  IN  _THE BUDGET 
The budgetary authority has authorized· 22 headings with token entries in the 1994· budget-
to cover any payment of  guarantees. ·These headings can be divided into three categories: 
borrowing  and  lending  within  ·the  Community,  borrowing  and  lending  outside  the 
Community and guarantees given to financial institutions. 
I.  BORROWINGS TO BE ON-LENT W~;THE  COMMUNITY 
A.  COMMUNITY BORROWING OPERATIONS TO PROVIDE 
BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SUPPORT 
The· Community is authorized to borrdw on the capital markets or· from financial 
institutions  and  make  the sums  raised  available  to Member  States experiencing 
temporary balance-of-payments difficulties. 
The outstanding amount of  loans granted to Member States for this purpose may 
not exceed ECU 14 billion in principal. 
At 30 June 1994 there was one operation in respect of Greece under the decision 
of 4 March 1991  and  one  operation  in  respect  of Italy  under the  decision  of 
18 January 1993. 
At  30 June 1994  the  amount  outstanding  was· ECU 1  000 million  in  loans  to 
Greece and ECU 4 004.9 nlillion in loans to Italy (Table 1). 
I 
B.  EURATOM BORROWING OPERATIONS 
In  1977  the  Commission  was  empowered  to borrow funds  to be used  to help 
finance nuclear power stations.  · 
Loans are made to electricity producers and carry the usual guarantee demanded 
by banks.  Recipients are often State-owned companies or companies enjoying a 
State guarantee. 
The  maximum  amount  of borrowings  authorized  is  ECU 4 billion,  of which 
ECU 500 million was authori?:ed by the 1977 decision, ECU 500 million in  1980, ·. 
· ECU  .1  billion  in  1982,  ECU 1 billion  in  1985. and  ECU 1 billion  in 1990.  The· 
amount  . borrowed  comes  to  around  -Ecu·2 900 million,  leaving 
ECU 1 100 million which may still be raised. -4-
At 30 June 1994 the total outstanding was'ECU 861.6 million. 
· On 9 December 1992  the ·Commission proposed that the  balance of borrowings · 
not used in the Member States col.lld be used to finance the improvement of the 
· degree· of  efficiency and safety of  nuclear power stations in the countries of  Central 
and; Eastern Europe and ~  the CIS. 
The Counciladopted a decision to this effect in the first half of 1994 (see Part II-
Loans raised for non-Community countries) . 
. C  ·BORROWING  OPERATIONS  FOR  THE  PROMOTION·  OF. 
INVESTMENT IN THE COMMUNITY 
The Cominission was  empowered by a Council Decision of 16 Octobet: 1978  to 
borrow  funds  to  be  used ·to  promote  investment  in  the  Cotnn1unity  (New 
Community Instrument). .  · 
The authorized borrowing ceiling was fixed  at ECU 1 billion by the Decision of 
16 October 1978  and  was  then  raised  by  ECU 1 billion  by . the  Decision  of . 
15 March 19S2.  The ceiling was further raised by ECU3 billion by the Decision 
ofJ9 April'f983 ~md by ECU 750 million by the Decisio~ of9 March 198i . 
The proceeds of the operations are paid out in  the form of loans granted by the 
EIB, acting for the Commission, to. finance investment projects which contribute · 
to  greater  convergence  and .  growing  integration  and  are  consistent  ~th the 
priority Community objectives irt  the energy,  industry and  infrastructure sectors, 
taking account of such factors as the regional impact of  the projects and.the ·need 
to combat unemployment.  Support for small businesses was also made a priority 
obje.ctive by the Decision of  26 April 1982.  · 
. A Decision of  20 January 1981  also empowered the Community to contract loans 
in order to provide exceptional aid ofECU I billion to the regions ofltaly affected 
by  the  earthquake  of  November 1980.  A · similar  decision.  involving 
ECU 80 million was adopted on 14 December 1981  for the regions affected by the - . 
earthquakes in Greece in February/March 1981. 
The  maximum  amount  of  borrqwings  autporized  thus  comes  to 
ECU 6.830 million~· 
At 30 June  ~994 the total outstanding was ECU 1 880.2 milliori,3J.l6% less than 
on 30 June 1993. 
The risk is  spread over a large ilu.mber  of  borrowers~  ... In· addition,  most of the 
loans are global  loans to financial  institution~ which guarantee repayment of the 
funds.  ·  . ·  . - 5-
Every year ,the Effi provide~  the Commission with a list of  debtors who, according 
"tO "its ·information, risk defaulting in the coming year  •.• So  cfar, ·no names have been 
recorded on this list. 
·  IT.  LOANS  RAISED  FOR  ON-LENDING  ·TO  ·NON-COMMUNITY 
COUNTRIES 
·A.  .  EURATOM  BORROWINGS  .FOR  CERTAIN  NON-COMMUNITY. 
COUNTRIES 
On  21.March 1994  the· Council  decided  to .amend  Decision 77/270/Euratom to 
authorize the Commission to contract Euratom borrowings in order to contribute 
· to the  financing  required  for  improving  the  degree  of safety  and  efficiency  of 
nuclear power stations in certain non-member countries. 
This  Decision  will  allow  a  considerable  proportion  of  ~uratom's  available 
borrowing capacity (some ECU 1 100million) to be used to finance projects.  For 
these projects to be eligible they inust relate to: 
- nuclear  power stations  or installations  in  the  nuclear  fuel·  cycle  which  are in 
service, or under construction; · 
- or to the dismantling of  installations which cannot be brought up to standard for 
· technical or economic reasons.  -
) 





Republic of  Slovenia 
Czech Republic 
Slovak Republic  _ 
Russian Federation 
Republic of  Armenia 
Ukraine 
The idea of international  financial  aid  for the  closure of the Chemobyl  nuclear  -
power plant was entered in the conclusions of  both the Corfu European Council of 
· 24 and 25 June 1994 and the G7 summit at Naples on 7 and 8 July 1994. -6-
B.  ~PROGRAMME  OF  ·BORROWINGS·  CONTRACTED  BY  THE 
ceOMMUNITY  TO  · PROVIDK '·  · MEDIUM-TERM  FINANCIAL\ 
. ASSISTANCE. TO  THE  COUNTRIES  OF.  CENTRAL  AND  ·EASTERN . 
·EUROPE: 
1. ·HUNGARY 
(a)  Hungary I 
·-·The  Community  is· granting  Hungary  a  medium-term  loan  of· up  ~o . 
ECU 870 million. in  principal for a· maximum  of. five  years.  The loan is 
·intended to facilitate the adjustment of the. Hungarian econor:ny  in  a way 
- , which will enable it :io derive all the bene~ts of  a market-based econon1y.  . 
_It is being made available in .tranches. 
The first tranche ofECU 350million was paid ori 20 April1990.  A second 
· ·tranche of ·ECU 260 million  was  paid  on  14 February ·1991.  The third 
tranche, which is not to exceed ECU 260 million; was planned for 1992 but 
was  not  paid . out  as  Hungary's  balance  of· payments  has . been· more 
favourable than expected.  The tranches will  be repaid in  one instalment 
after five  years  and interest,  which is  at  variable  rates,  is  payable  half-
yearly.  ·  ·  · 
At  30 Jurie  1~94  the  amount  outstanding  on  ·borrowings  under  this 
·operation  came toECU 61,0 million.  .  · 
(b)  Hungary U 
As  the  break-up  of  the  Council  for  Mutual  Economic  Assistance 
(Coi:necon)  and  the  Gulf  crisis  threatened  to  compromise  the  initial 
encouraging results of  the reforms undertaken, it was decided to Iaurich a 
supplementary borrowing and iending operation for ECU 180 million pnder · 
an overall ECU 360 mil~ion G-24 aid programme. 
The frrst tran<;:he of  ECU  ·1 00 million was paid on 14 August 1991.  It will , 
be  repaid  in .one  instalment· after- seven  years;  and  interest,  \vhich  is-at 
.. variable · rates,  is  payable  half-yearly. .  The  second  tranche.  of 
ECU 80 million ;was  due paid  on 15 January 1993.- It will· be repaid  in 
Jan'!Jary 1997 and interest, which is at a-fixed rate, is payable annua!ly. 
At  30 ~une 1994  the  amount  ou·standing- on- borrowings  under  this 
operation came to ECU 180 million, -7-
2.  CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
As part of G-24's total aid  of around ECU 750 million,  the Commission,  on 
behalf ·or  the  Community,  was· empowered ·to ·borrow,.- in  two  tranches, ..... 
ECU 375 million for a period· of seven years.  The proceeds of this operation--
were  to  be  on-lent  on  the  same  terms  to  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Federal .. 
Republic. 
The first tranche ofECU 185 million was paid· on 14 August 1991.  It-will be 
· repaid  in  one instalment" .after  seven years,  and  interest,  which is  at variable .. 
rates, is payable half-yearly. 
The second tranche of  ECU 190 million was paid on 2 March 1992 and will b.e  · 
repaid in one instalment after six years. 
Following  the  division  of Czechoslovakia  into  the  Czech  Republic  and  the 
Slovak Republic on 1 January 1993, the Commission proposed that the loan be 
divided between the two Republics. 
Under  th~ Council  decision  of 24 January 1994,  two  thirds  of the  loan  -
ECU 250 million  - will  be  for  the  Czech  Republic  and  one  ·third  -
ECU 125 million - for the Slovak Republic. 
At 30 June 1994 the amount outstanding on borrowings for the two republics 
came to ECU 375 million. 
3.  BULGARIA 
(a)  Bulgaria I 
As part ofG-24's total aid ofECU 580 million, the Commission, on behalf 
· of  the  Community,  was  empowered  to  borrow,  in  two  tranches, 
ECU 290 million  for  a  period  of seven  years.  The  proceeds  of this 
operation were to be on-lent on the same terms to Bulgaria. 
The  first  tranche  of  ECU 150 million  was  paid  to  Bulgaria · on 
14 August 1991.  It will be repaid in one instalment after seven years, and 
interest, which is at variable rates, is payable half-yearly. 
The .second  tranche of ECU 140 million  was paid  on  2 March 1992  and· 
will  be  repaid  in  one  instalment  after  five  years.  Interest,  which  is  at 
-~variable rates, is payable half-yearly. 
At 30 June 1994 the amount outstanding on borrowings for Bulgaria, came 
to ECU 290 million. - 8-
'(b)  Bulgaria IT 
-_As  part of G-24's total aid  of  -ECU 220 million  in _1992  and ·1993,  the _ 
-Commission,  oil-behalf-of the Community;  was· empowered  to  borrow . _ 
ECU II  0 million- in two tranches of ECU 70 million  and ECU 40 million -
for_ a maximum .period of  seven years.  The proceeds of  this operation were 
to be on-lent to Bulgaria. 
Since  the  conditions  for  Community  assistance  had ·not  been  met  by -
_30 June I994, neither of  the two trancheshave yet been paid out. 
4.  ROMANIA_ 
{a)- Romaniai 
\ 
As part ofG-24's total aid ofECU 750 million, the Commission, on behalf 
of the Community,- was empowered -to  borrow ECU 375 million  in two 
· tranches  for  a  maximum  period  of seven  years.  The  proceeds  of this 
operation were to be on-lent on the same tenils to Romania. 
The first tranche ofECU 190.million for a term of  seven years was paid on 
22 January 19§2. --It will be repaid in one instalment on  1 February 1999, -
and·inter~st, which is at variable rates, is payable half-yearly. 
The second tranche of  ECU 185 million .for a term of  six-years was paid in 
April 1992  and  will  be  repaid  in·  one  instalment  on  18 March 1998. 
Interest, which is at variable rates, is payable half-yearly. 
At 30 June 1994 the amount outstanding on borrowings for Romania came  . 
to ECU 45 5 million . 
•  < 
(b)  Romania II 
As part ofG-24's new aid  ofECU 160 rhitlion,.the Commission, on behalf-
of the .Community,  was  empowered -to  borrow  ECU 80 million  for  a  -
' maximum period of  seven year~.  The proceeds of  this operation were to be 
on-lent on the same terms to Romania. 
In  view  of its  size,  _the  loan  was  paid  out  in  -a  single  tranche  on 
26 February 1993.  It 'Yill be repaid in one instalment on 26:February 2000, ./ 
and interest is payable half-yearly. 
(c)  Romania III /. 
-9-
As part of G-24's overall macrofinancial aid, the Commission, on behalf of 
....  ~the-Community, was empowered by the CounciLDecision of20 June 1994 
to'  borrow  ECU 125 million  in  two  tranches  of ECU 90 million  and 
ECU 3  5 million for a maximum period of  seven years .. The proceeds of 
this operation ate to be on-lent on the same terms to Romania. 
No tranc_he had been paid at 30June 1994. 
C.  BORROWINGS  CONTRACTED  BY  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  GRANT 
FINA~CIAL ASSISTANCE  TO  THE  REPUBLICS  OF  THE FORMER 
SOVIET UNION 
- Medium-term loan of  ECU l  250 million 
The Commission has proposed a medium-term loan of  up to ECU 1 250 million 
for  the ·Soviet  Union  and/or  its  Republics  in  order  to  finance  imports  of 
agricultural products, foodstuffs and medicines from the Community and Eastern 
Europe for a maximum period of  three years. 
Parliament ·delivered  a favourable  opinion and  the Council  adopted  its formal 
decision on 16 December 1991 .. 
At the beginning of 1992 the loan was divided between the various Republics of 
the former Soviet Union. 
1.  Loan contracts signed on the basis of  the original breakdown 
Most of  the loan contracts were signed in the course of 1992: 
-with  Armenia  (ECU 38 million),  Kyrgyzstan  (ECU 32 million), 
Turkmenistan  (ECU 45 million)  and  Moldova  (ECU 27 million)  on 
10 July 1992;  the  amount  for  Kyrgyzstan  has  since  been  r·educed  to 
ECU 23.7 million at the request of  the Kyrgyzstan authorities; 
-with Ukraine (ECU 130 million) on 13 July 1992; 
-with Belarus  (ECU 102 million),.-Tajikistan  (ECU 55 million)  and  Georgia 
(ECU 70 million) on 24 July 1992; 
- with Russia (ECU 150 million) on 9 September 1992; 
-with Russia (ECU 349 million) on 9 December 1992; 
-with Kazakhstan (ECU 25 million) on 15 December 1992; 
2.  Loan contracts signed on the basis of  the amended breakdown 
· Some loan contracts were also  signed in ·1993 ·after the initial breakdown of 
the total amount ofthe loan-had been changed: - 10-
..;  on  5 May 1993  two  further  contracts  were  signed  with . Armenia 
·•(EGU,20 million)  and Georgia (ECU 10-million).~--Xhe.amount represented. 
by these two loans had-originally been allocated to Ka.zaldlstan; 
- on 6 December 1993 ·a further. loan contract of ECU 40 million was signed 
with Georgia.  This loan wn financed by reducing Uzbekistan's allocation. 
3.  Loan contracts not yet sign~d 
At 30 June 1994 three new loan contracts were in preparation but had still not 
been signed.  The loans are for:  · 
- Kazakhstan  ·  (ECU 30 million);  the  loan  will  be  financed  ·by  reducing 
Uzbekistan's allocation; 
- Azerbaijan  (ECU 68 million)  and  Uzbekist.an  (ECU 59 million);  the  two 
· countries· did  not  satisfy  the  conditions  fo~  eligibility  for  this  lending 
operation until late 1993JUzbekistan) and early 1994 (Azerbaijan). 
4.  Utilization of  the ECU l  250 miliion loan 
Republic  Initial breakdown  Breakdown at  Actual utilization at 
~ 
(1992)  30.6.1994  30.6.1994 
Armenia a  38  38  37.7 
Armenia b  - 20  19.4 
Azerbaijan  ..  68  * 68 
Belarus  102  100.5  100.5 
Georgia a  70  70  69.4 
Georgia b  10  9.8 
Georgia c  '  40 
~ 
32.0 
Kazakhstan a  55  25  23.8 
Kazakhstan b  30 
Kyrgyzstan  32  23.7  22.7 
Moldova  27  27  26.9 
Russia a  - 150  150  63.9 
Russia b  349  349  298.8 
Tajikistan  55  55  54:5 
Turkmenistan  45  45  44.9 
Ukraine  130  130  129.8 
Uzbekistan  129  * 59 
Total  '·.  1250  1240.2 
.. 
934.4 
· •-•'!leontracts·not signed at 30.6.1994. - 11-
At  30 June 1994  the  amount  of  loans  actually  being  used  came  tp 
.  ECU934.4 million. 
5.  Capital repayment and interest payment dates 
·The  capital  repayment  and ·interest ·payment  dates ·for .  this  operation  vary 
· depending on the date on which the loan contract was signed and the amount 
ofthe loan: 
-·  Armenia · (ECU 38. million),  -Belarus,·. (@>rgia  · (ECU  -70 · million), . 
Kyrgyzstan,  Moldova,  Tajikistan,  Turkmerustan, ·  Ukraine,  Russia . 
(ECU 150 million):  · 
interest on 20 April and 20 October 
- capital  on  20  August  1995  (half on  20 August 1994  and  half on 
· 20 August 1995 for Belarus, Ukraine and Russia) 
- Armenia  (ECU 20 million), !: Kazakhstan,  Russia  (ECU 349 million), 
Georgia (ECU 10 million and ECU 40 million): 
- · interest on 15 January and 15 July 
-- . capital  on  15 January 1996  (half  o~ 15 January 1995  and  half on 
15 January 1996  for  Russia  and  15 January 1997  for  Georgia 
(ECU 40 million)). 
At 30 June 1994 Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had defaulted on interest 
ofECU 7.42 million (see Part IV- Activation ofguarantees). 
- Financial assistance for Moldova 
As  part of the  Community's  contribution  to  the  international  aid  scheme  for 
Moldova, the Commission,  on behalf of the Community,  was empowered by  a 
decision  of 13 June 1994  to  borrow  ECU 45 million  in  two  tranches  for  a 
maximum period of ten years.  The proceeds of this operation are to be on-lent 
on the same terms to Moldova. 
This aid will be granted under Moldova's economic reform programme backed by ~ . 
the  IMF.  A  confirmation  agreement . with  the  IMF  was  reached  on, 
17 December 1993. 
No tranche had yet been paid at 30 June 1994. 
D.  BORROWINGS  CONTRACTED  BY  THE  COMMUNITY  TO  GRANT 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE BALTIC. STATES 
.·.:As  p·art  of the G-24's total aid  of ECU 440 inillion'for·these three countries,. the 
Commission,  on  behalf  of  the  Community,  was  empowered  to  borrow - 12-
.  . 
ECU220 million for a period of seven years.  The proceeds of  thiS:  operation are. 
··to, be·on-lent on simiiar terms in two tranches:  · 
· - ECU40 million for Estonia; · 
- ECU 80 million for Latvia; 
-ECU 100 million for Lithuania. 
The· first  tranches  of the  loan  for  Estonia  (ECU 20 million) ;  and  for  Latvia 
(ECU 40 million) were paid on 31 March 1993.  The loans·are to be-repaid in one 
··  instalment on 31 March  2000 and interest,-,which is at variabie rates, is payable half 
-yearly every 31 March and 30 September. 
The first tranche for Lithuania was paid on 27 July 1993;  it is to· be repaid in  one 
instalment on 27 July 2000 and interest, which is at a fixed rate, is payabie annually 
every 27 July. 
At 30 June 1994 the amount outstanding on the borrowings for the B·altic  States 
came to ECU 110 million.  · 
E. .  BORROWINGS  CONTRACTED  BY  THE  COMMUNI'fV  TO . GRANT 
FINAN~IAL  ASSISTANCE TO THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES · 
1.  ISRAEL 
/ 
As part of the financial  assistance agreed for Israel and the  pop~lation of the 
occupied territories, the Comrri.ission was empowered to borrow,  on behalf of 
the Community,  ECU.160~million in  one tranche for a period of seven years. 
The  proceeds  were  to  be  paid  Ol,lt  to  Israel  on  the  same  terms and  are 
accompanied  by  an  interest  subsidy  of ECU 27.5 million  paid  from·  the · 
Community budget.. 
This operation started on 2 March 1992.  The borrowing is to be repaid in full 
on 15 December 1997. · 
At 30 June 1994 the amount outstanding on the borrowings for Israel came to 
ECU 160 milli.on.  . 
.2. ALGERIA 
The  Coinmission,A<;>n  behalf of the .Community,  was  empowered  to  borroyv 
ECU 400 million  for  a  maximum  period  of seven  years  in  two  tranches  of 
ECU 250 million and ECU 150 million.  The proceeds of  this operation were to . 
: be on-ient.oh the same tenits to Algeria.  . - 13  ~ 
A bridging loan was granted on 23 December 1991  to cover the first  tranche 
·and  was  repaid  from  the  net · proceeds  of the .  borrowing . contracted  on 
14 January 1992 for a period of  six years. 
The loan is to be repaid in one instalment on 15 December 1997 and interest is ,_ 
-payable annually every 15 December. 
At 30 June 1994 the amount outstanding on the loans raised for Algeria came. 
to ECU 250 million.
1 
ill.  COMMUNITY GUARANTEE TO NON-COMMUNITY COUNTRIES 
A.  EUROPEAN  INVESTMENT  BANK  LOANS  TO  MEDITERRANEAN 
COUNTRIES GUARANTEED BY THE GENERAL BUDGET  b  . 
Under  the  terms  of the  Council  Decision  of 8 March 1977,  the  Community 
· guarantees loans to be granted by the European Investment Bank as part of the  ... 
Community's financial commitments towards the Mediterranean countries. 
This decision was the basis for the contract of  guarantee signed by the European 
Economic Community and the European Investment Ballk on 30 October 1978 in 
Brussels  and  10 November 1978  in  Luxembourg introducing  a global  guarantee 
of75% on all  credit  lines  made  available  for  loans· in  the  following  countries: 
Portugal  (Financial  Protocol,  pre~accession  aid),  Greece,  Spain  (financial 
cooperation), Malta,  Tunisia,  Algeria,  Morocco, Turkey,  Cyprus, Egypt, Jorda11; 
Syria, Israel, Yugoslavia and Lebanon. 
In addition,  by  way of exception,  a  100% guarantee  covers  loans_  allocated  for 
emergency  aid  to  Portugal  in  accordance  with  the  Council  Decision  of 
7 October 1975. 
A new extension of  the contract of  guarantee is established for each new Financial 
Protocol. 
The  loans  authorized  at  30 June 1994  total  ECU 7 78~ million,  of  which 
ECU 1 500 million is for  Spain,  Greece and Portugal and ECU 6 282 million for 
the  non-member  Mediterranean  countries.  At  30 June 1994  the  total ·of 
outstanding loans came to ECU 2 161 million (taking account of  the 75% limit), of 
which  ECU 527 million  was  accounted  for  by  Spain,  Greece. and  Portugal  and 
ECU 1 634 million by the non-member Mediterqmean countries. 
The  second  tranche was  paid  on'  17 August 1994.  The  Joan  is  to  be  repaid  in  full  on 
17 August 2001 and interest is payable annually every 17 August. - 14-
There -is  also · provision  for  Em  loans  outside  these  protocols  under  Council _ 
··Regulation·(EEC} No _1763/92  of29 June 1992 concern1ng financial  cooperation 
_  in respect of  all Mediterranean non-member countries. 
Em loans under this operation must ·not exceed ECU  .1  800 million.  Overall,  a- , 
· 75% guarantee is provided. 
-
At  30 June 1994  ECU 422 million· had  been· made  available;  of this  total, 
ECU 5.2 million had been paid;  this  figure  corresponds to the amount currently 
outstanding  . 
. On.  19 July -1993  the  Council  decided  to  conclude  a  new  protocol  with  the 
Republic  of Slovenia:  iri· o.rder  to finance  project~ to contribute· to .the  countr-Ys 
economic  development through loans  totalling  ECU 150 million  from  the Em's 
. own resources for a period of  up to five years with a 75% budget guarantee. 
·;- on·24 January 1994  the Council  decided  to conclude  the  fourth  protocol with 
Syria  in  order  to  finance  projects  to  contribute  to  the  country's  economic 
development· through  loans  totalling  ECU 115 million·  from  the  BIB's  own 
resources for.a period of  up to three years with a 75% budget guarantee  ... 
At  30 June 1994,  the  breakdown  of authorizations  by  country· (non-member 
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2  Including ~CU  115 million under the fourth protocol authorized in January 1994. 
3  The second protocol with Yugoslavia was suspended when ECU 100 million of credits could still be 
granted. - 15-
The loans are generally for  15 years with 3 to 4-year periods of grace on capital 
repayments. 
B.  LOANS  GRANTED  BY  THE ·EUROPEAN  INVESTMENT  BANK  IN· 
·•  COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
In  respons~ to  a  call  made  by  the  Council  on  9 October 1989,  the  Board of 
Governors of the European Investment Bank decided  on 29 November 1989 to 
authorize the Bank to provide loans from its own resources to finance investment 
projects in Hungary and Poland for a total amount not-exceeding ECU 1 billion. 
These loans are granted to finance  investment projects which satisfy the Bank's .  · 
usual requirements for loans from its own resources.  The contract of guarantee 
covering 100% of  the lending operations was signed on 24 April 1990 in Brussels 
and  14 May 1990 in Luxembourg. 
On  14 May 1991  the budgetary authority extended this  100% guarantee to loans· 
made  in  Czechoslovakia,  Bulgaria  and  Romania  up  to  a  maximum  of 
ECU 700· million. 
The extension of  the contract of  guarantee was signed on 31  July 1991 .. 
On 23  October 1992 the Commission presented a proposal for a Council Decision 
extending  this  100%  Community  guarantee to losses  incurred  by  the Em as  a 
result of  loans granted to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; this was approved by the 
budgetary authority in its decision of  15 March 1993.  · 
The overall ceiling on loans which the Em may grant in these countries was set at 
ECU 200 million for a period of  three years. 
On  18 December 1992 the Commission also proposed the extension of  this  100% 
guarantee to losses incurred by the EIB as a result of  loans granted in Albania. 
On  13 December 1993  the budgetary  authority  renewed  the  100%  Community 
guarantee for a period of  three years for loans granted by the EIB in, the countries 
of Central and  Eastern Europe (including the Baltic States and  Albania)  up  to a 
maximum ofECU 3 billion.
4 
. 
The loans are generally long-term:  15 years on average with 3 to 4-year periods of 
grace on capital repayments  . 
.  At  30 June 1994, ECU 1 660 million  had  been made available in  the Central and· 
Eastern European countries but only ECU 39~ million had been disbursed  .. 
C.  LOANS GRANTED BY THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK IN NON 
-MEMBER COUNTRIES. 
4 
At  its  meeting  of 19 May 1992  the  Council  (Economic  and  Financial  Affairs) 
adopted  the guidelines  proposed  by  the  Commission  for  the  extension  of EIB 
activities-outside the Community and asked.it.to.grantJoans.in accordance with its 
. statutes and its usual criteria to projects of  mutual interest in certain non-member 
The contract of guarantee was signed  on  22 July 1994 in  Brussels  and  on 12 August 1994 in 
Luxembourg. ' - 16  _-
.  . 
countries
1 
(the developing  countries of Asia and  Latin America)  With  which  the 
Community has COI').Cluded cooperation agreements. 
An overall "limit of  ECU 250 miiliol) per year has been set for a 3~year period;. this 
ceiling will be reviewed at the·end of  the period.  · 
These loans benefit from 100% Commuruty budget guarantees.  The Commission . 
presented  a  proposal for a decision to this effect  on l  June 1992.  The formal 
Council Decision  followed  on  15 February 1993.  _ The  contract  of ~arantee 
between the Community, and the Em was signed on4 November 1993 in Brussels 
and on 17 November 1993 in Luxembourg.  .  · .  ·  .  _  ·  /- __ .  . 
At  30 June 1994  credit  lines  of ECU 139 million  had  been  signed  but  no 
disbursements had taken place. 
D.  COMMUNITY  CREDIT  · GUARANTEE  FOR  EXPORTS  OF 
AGRICULTURAL  PRODUCTS  AND  FOODSTUFFS  FROM  THE 
CO~TY  TO THE FORMER SOVIET UNION  . 
· The  Community  has  decided  to  guarantee loans  granted  to  the  former  Soviet 
Union  by  a  pool  of banks  to  finance  imports  of agricultural · products  and 
foodstuffs originating in the Community and the countries of Central and Eastern 
. Europe.  ·  · 
The Communi!)' guarantee co~ers 98%, up to a maximum orECU 500 million,  of 
any  losses  in  principal  (around  ECU 408 million)  . and  interest·  (around 
ECU 92 million).·  .  · 
.  .  . 
As 'the credit .line  has riot been used  in  full  ·a~d as  the time limit for use has not 
been  extended,  the  amount guaranteed  comes  to  only  ECU 375.5 million ·ir1 
principal and ECU 80.3 million in interest.  ·  · 
The  Community  will  receive  a  surety  commission· of  0.67%  of the  amount 
guaranteed in consideration forthis guarantee.· Halfofthis commission was paid  · 
on 26December 1991 under the terms ofthe contract.  The balance corresponding 
· to the Community guarantee was paid on 28 January -1993. 
_  On  26 November 1991  the  terms  of the loan  and  the  arrangements  for  the 
utilization  of the funds  were laid  down  in  an  exchange  of letters  between. the 
Commission and the Soviet authorities .. On the saine day the 'Community a.'no the . 
banks signed a contract of  guarantee:  ·  · 
.  .  .  .  . 
Fqllowing  the  disappearance of the  Soviet  Union,  it  has  been  decided  that the 
funds will be used by the Russian Republic.  ·  · 
The loan is for three-and a halfyears froth the date of  signature. 
Interest is  payabl~ half-yearly and the principal will be repaid in three instalments, 
20, 31  and 42 months after the agreement has been signed.  · 5 
- 17-























Actual date of  payment . 
'18.11.1993. 
All the default interest has been paid on late payments up to 9 March 1994. 
The  capital  repayment  due  on  26 June 1994  was  made  on  14 July 1994  together  with  the 
corresponding interest. - 18-
PART TWO:  RISK SITUATION 
There are two possible methods for evaluating the. risks borne by the Community budget: 
- the method, often used by bankers, of  the total" amount of  capital outstanding for the : -
operations concerned on· a given date; 
the  more  budgetary  approach  of c_alculating ··  the  maximum  amount  which  the 
Community could have to pay out  in each financial year. 
The second approach itselfhas been applied in two different ways: 
- by  referen~e only to ~ctual disbursements at 30 June 1994, giving the minimum level'of 
risk to the Community assuming that there are no early repayments; 
- on a more forward-looking basis,  by reference to all  the operations proposed by  the 
Commission in  order to estimate the impact on.- future  budgets,· giving the maximum 
· /  ·  · risk' borne by the Community assuming that the Commission's proposals are accepted  . 
.!"  .  •  l 
For  the  latter  exercise  a  number  of assumptions  have. to  be  made  about  dates  of 
·  disbursement~ terms of repayment, interest. and exchange rates;  details are. given in  the 
annex.  However,  this  method. does  give  some  idea  about the  future  level  of risks 
connected with the proposals made.  · 
The results are shown in  the attached tables, ·which assess the risk relating to countries 
inside the Community and .countries outside the Community. 
The overall figures quoted cover risks of  different types;  loan~ to one country in the case 
of financial assistance· and loans for projects guaranteed by the borrowers in  the case of 
NCI and Em operations, for example. · 
The following  analysis  distinguishes  between tot(ll  risk,  the  risk· in  respect of Member 
States and the risk in respect ofnon-membe.r countries. 
I..  TOTAL RISK· 
A. ·  AMOUNT OUT~TANDING  AT 30 JUNE 1994 (Table 1) 
.  .  . 
The total risk at 30 June 1994  came  to ECU 13  798 million,  4.0%  less  than  at 
31 December 1993.  ·  · 
B.  . MA.XI.MUM ANNUAL RISK BORNE BY THE COMMUNITY BUDGET: · 
OPERATIONS DISBURSED AT30 JUNE 1994 (Table 2) 







2 856 million(+ 3%) 
3 056 million (  + 7%) 
2 797 million(- 8.5%) 
3 055 million(+ 9%) 
794 million(- 74%) 
3 241  million(+ 408%) - 19-
* , No  capital  repayments  for  the  balance-of-payments  loans· to  the  Member 
"States;  capital  repayments  on  loans  to  Hungary;--the · Czech  and  Slovak 
Republic and Bulgaria end in 1998.  · 
C.  MAXIMUM  THEORETICAL  ANNUAL  RISK  BORNE  BY  THE ·· 
C~MMUNITY  BUDGET (Table 3) 
This  risk  comes  to  ECU 3 03 5 million  in  1994  and  will  increase  regularly  as 
follows until2000 (except in 1999 when it will total ECU 2 588 million):  . 
·1995:  3 628 million(+ 19.5%) 
- 1996:  4 026 million(+ 11%) 
- 1997:  4 221  million(+ 5%) 
- 1998:  4 602 million(+ 9%) 
- 1999:  2 588 million(- 44%) 
- 2000:  7 116 million(+ 275%) 
··rr.  RISK· IN RESPECT OF THE MEMilER STATES 
A.  AMOUNT OUTSTANDING AT 30 JUNE 1994 (Table 1) 
The amount of capital outstanding in respect of operations in the Member States 
came  to  ECU 8 274 million  at  30 June 1994,  a  fall  of 7:9%  compared  with 
31 December 1993.  , 
This fall  is mainly due to the reduction in  outstanding loans to Greece, Euratom 
and the NCI.  · 
The amount outstanding from the other operations has fallen or remained stable. 
B.  MAXIMUM ANNUAL RISK BORNE BY THE COMMUNITY BUDGET: 
OPERATIONS DISBURSED AT 30 JUNE 1994 (Table 2) 
The ri~k for 1994 comes to ECU 1 900 million. 
'  The  total  maximum  annual  risk  to  the  Community  budget  in  relation  to 
disbursements (Table 2)  changes  in  line with the  capital  repayments (every two 
years)  on balance-of-payment  loans to  Greece and  Italy.  The maximum  risk  is 
highest in the even years leading up to 2000 when it will reach ECU  2 784 million. 
C.  MAXIMUM  THEEORETICAL  ANNUAL  ·RISK  BORNE  BY  THE 
COMMUNITY BUDGET (Table 3) 
., 
The trend is much the same as in Table 2 up to 2000 when the risk will amourtt to 
ECU 5 168 million and 2001 when it will amount to ECU2 201 million. -20--
ill.  RISK IN RESPECT OF NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES 
'A~- -XMOUNT OUTSTANDING AT 30 JuNE  1994 fTable'l) 
The amount of  capital outstanding at 30 June I994 came to ECU 5 524 million, an , _ 
increase of  5% compared with 3I December I993.  - -
-B. - MAXIMUM ANNUAL RISK BORNE BY THE COMMUNITY BUDGET: 
OPERATIONS DISBlffiSED AT 30 JUNE 1994 (Table 2) 
The  risk  for  I994  comes  to  ECU 880 million  and  will  increase  to 
ECU I 654 million in  I995, mainly because two repayments of principal then fall, 
due:  · 
- - ECU 350 million from Hungary; 
- ECU 553 niillion from the Republics of  the former Soviet Union. 
The risk will  drop in  I996 to ECU 976 million  and increase  again  in  I997  to 
-ECl.J I 327 million as the following payments fall due:-
- ECU 80 million from Hungary;  -
- ECU I27 million from the Czech Republic; 
ECU 63  million from the Slovak Republic; -
ECU 140 million from Bulgaria; 
- ECU 250 million from Algeria; 
- ECU 160 million from Israel. 
At ECU I- 0 1  0 million, the risk will be smaller but still at a high level in  1998, but 
should fall to ECU 502 million in 1999 and ECU 457 million in 2000.  · 
C.  MAXIMUM  THEORETICAL  ANNUAL  -RISK  BORNE  BY  THE 
COMMUNITY BUDGET (Table 3)  . 
The risk will rise from ECU 964 million in -1994 to ECU 2 084 million in 1995; in 
particular,  the Republics. of the  former  Soviet. Union  are to- repay  principal  of 
ECU 687 million that year.  · 
.  .  - .  . 
The risk will drop to ECU 1 520 million in  1996, rise again to ECU 2 328 million 
in  1997,  ECU 2 I28 million  in  1998,  ECU 1 901  million  in  1999, 
ECU 1 948 million in 2000 and ECU 2 322 million in 2001: - 21  -
IV.  ACTIVATION OF BUDGET GUARANTEES 
1.  -
1Effi loans to non-memb.er countries 
· In the first half of 1994, the Em again called-on the budget guarantee in respect of 
loans  of  around  ECU 6.0 million  to  the  Republics ·of foirner  Yugoslavia 
· (Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia and Serbia).  The payment was made to the EIB ., 
on 28 May 1994.  · 
On 21 June 1994, the EIB again called on the budget guarantee in respect of  loans 
of  around ECU 8.6 million to the Republics offormer Yugoslavia (Macedonia and. 
Serbia).  The payment was made to the Em in late September 1994. 
At 30 June the total amount of  debts settled by the Community and not yet repaid 
by the defaulting debtors came to ECU 34.6 million.  These debts were owed by 
all the Republics of  former Yugoslavia with the exception of  Slovenia and Croatia. 
2.  ·The Commission also made payments from its cash resources under Article 12 of 
6 
Council  Regulation  No 1552/89  of  29 May 1989  implementing  Decision 
-.  88/376/EEC, Euratom on the system of  the Communities' own resources: 
(a)  loans  .granted  by  a  consortium  of banks  guaranteed  by  the  Community 
(ECU 500 million) 
- payment of interest due  from Russia on 9 March 1994  and principal and 
interest due on 26 June 1994 in respect of a loan granted by a consortium 
of  banks and guaranteed by the Community; 
(b)  loans granted by the Community to the Republics of the former Soviet Union 
(ECU 1 250 million)  · 
- payment of  interest: 
due  from  four  Republics  of the former  Soviet Union  (Russia,  Armenia, 
Georgia and Kazakhstan) on 15 January 1994 in respect of the borrowing 
and lending operation ofECU 1 250 million for these Republics, 
due from  nine Republics of the former Soviet Union on 20 Aprill994 in 
respect ofthe same operation.  · 
These payments were eventually made by the debtors concerned, except in the 
case of  three Republics: Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, which had stilJ not.-
settled their debts on 30 June 1994. 
At 30 June 1994 the situation as regards unpaid debts was as follows: 




ECU 43.2 million (including 
ECU 28.6 million from before 1994) 
· ECU 4.2 million (including ECU 2 million. 
from before 1994) 
... ECU 0  ..  79 .million
6 
ECU 2.6 million 
The interest due on 20 April 1994 was paid on 21 July 1994. -22-
. PART THREE:  CHANGES IN POTENTIAL RISKS 
The figures· given in the previous parts provide information on the quantitative aspects of-
the risks borne bythe general budget.,  · 
. However; these. data should be weighted in accordance With aspects relating to the quality 
of  the risk; which depend on the type ofoperation and the standing of  the borrower. 
L  TYPES OF OPERATION 
The risks to which the above figures relate denve from a variety of  operations which can 
be divided into two categories:·· operations with macroeconomic objectives and those w~th 
microeconomic objectives. 
A.  OPERATIONS WITH :MACROECONOMIC OBJECTiyES 
· The first of  these are the balance of payments loans for Member States, normally 
carrying strict economic conditions and undertakings.  ·  ·  ·. 
Financial  assistance  operations  are  similar  in  nature ·but  are intended  for  non-
. member countries. 
Finally,  this  category includes  the credit guarantee of ECU 500 million  and  the 
loan  of ECU 1.250 million  to  finance  imports -of  agricultural  products  and 
foodstuffs  into  the  former  Soviet. Union,  since  the  risk  involved  in  these  two 
operations ' depends.  to  a  large  extent  on  macroeconomic  and  political 
developments in the recipient countries.  ·_ 
B.  OPERATIONS WITH MICROECONOMIC OBJECTIVES· 
.  -
These are loans to finance specific projects which. are usually repaid over the long 
term from funds which these projects are expected to generate~  as a rul~, they are 
granted  to  State  companies  or  financial  institutions  and,  in  addition  to  the. 
Community guarantee, .are covered by the usual guarantees demanded by banks. 
They are the Euratom and NCI loans in Member States and the Euratom and Elli . 
loans outside the Community (Mediterranean and Central and Eastern Europe and , 
· _ certain non-member countries- developing countries of  Asia and Latin America). -23-
A. ALGERIA 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION  · 
Following the rapid  worsening of  the internal  and ·external  economic  situation of 
'Algeria  towards  the  end  of 1993,  caused  by  security  problems  arid  declining 
hydrocarbon export prices, the authorities reached a new agreement with the IMF in 
April  1994 on an economic reform programme. The programme's main objective is  . 
to give a new impetus to economic growth while reducing inflation and  the fiscal 
· deficit.  It comprises  a  substantial  liberalisation  of prices,.  imports  and  the  foreign 
exchange regime, combined with stringent monetary· and fiscal policies. 
Substantial price increases and liberalisation measures were implemented in April. At 
the same time, the Algerian Dinar was devalued from 25  to 36. Dinar per US$. The 
resulting increase in inflation is expected to slqw down gradually.  Average inflation 
for  1994  is  expected to  remain  below 40%.  The  administrative  foreign  exchange 
allocation  system has  been  replaced  by  a  more  liberal  system  whereby banks  are 
allowed  to make their own allocation decisions.  The resulting  increase in  imports 
fuelled industrial and construction activities. GDP growth is forecasted to reach 3% 
in  1994,  following  a  1.8% decline  in  1993.  The overall  deficit of the government 
should decline from an unsustainable 9.2% ofGDP in 1993 to no more than· 5.7% of 
GOP in  1994.  The recent increase in hydrocarbon export prices is likely to ease the 
external financial constraints on the econoinic and financial recovery programme. 
2.  'DIE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
•. 
Export revenues, generated almost exclusively by hydrocarbon products, diminished 
by  10%  in  1993  and  are  projected to remain  low in  1994  as  world  hydrocarbon 
prices took a dip end 1993  and early 1994. The strict administrative imports regime, 
established  end  1992,  has  been  abandoned  in  May  1994  and  replaced  by  a  more 
liberal regime. As a res1,1lt,  imports are expected to increase by 20% in 1994, thereby 
giving  a boost to  economic growth.  The current account will  be  in  deficit,  to be 
financed  partly  by  the  rescheduling  of external  debt  service  due.  In view of the 
- economic and security situation, there were no foreign direct investments in 1993. 
The projected increase in the current account deficit will be financed by external debt 
rescheduling arrangements with the Paris Club and commercial creditors as well as 
new money from,  amongst others,  th~ IMF, the World Bank and the Community. In 
August  1994,  the· remaining  second  tranche  (ECU  150  million)  of the  1992 
Community  balance  of payments  loan  was  disbursed.  A  proposal  for  a  further 
balance of payments  loan  of up  to ECU 200  million  in  support  of the economic 
·reform-programme -is being considered. 
Algeria's foreign reserves position worsened somewhat in  1993  and  is  expected to 
remain at around US$ 1_.5 billion or 6 weeks of  imports throughout most of  1994. -24-
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
'End 1993, Algeria's foreign debt stock amounted toUS$ 24~6 billion, requiriitg US$ 
2.1  billion  in  interest  payments_ and· US$ 7.1 billion -in  repayments  of principaL 
Nearly  three quarters of this  debt  stock consisted  of publicly  guaranteed  private·. 
sector credits.  About 13% are bilateral credits, mostly non-concessional. 
·.The  downward trend in  export revenues,  due to decreasing oil prices,  undermined 
Algeria's debt service capacity. By early 1994, the debt service-to-exports ratio had 
climbed to close to 100% and, for the first time, accumulated arrears exceeded US$ 
0.5  billion by March 1994.  This created an unsustainable  situation.  Following the  , , 
agreement with the IMF on an economic reform programme, the Algerian authorities 
obtained,· in  June,  an  agreement  from  Paris  Clu15  creditors  on  a  rescheduling  of 
bilateral  debt.  At the  same  time, . the  authorities  announced  their  intention  to ·_ 
negotiate a debt rescheduling agreeinenfwith commercial creditors on similar tenns 
as those of  the Paris Club.  ·  .  ·  · 
As a result of  these reschedulings,  external debt  s_ervice  due during  th~ programme 
period with the IMF (May  1994-May 1995} should be reduced by  some US$ 4.9 
billion or more than 50% compared to scheduled debt service. Algeria should be able 
to  reach  external  viability ·again  by  the  end  of 1997.  Further  external  financia:l · 
support, notably froll) the IMF and through debt·reschedulings, will be required over 
the next three years. 
The 1992 Community balance· of  payments loan (ECU 250 million) is excluded from 
the rescheduling'  agreements  and  debt  service  on  this  loan  should  continue -as 
foreseen.  ·  --25-
B. BULGARIA 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
Stabiiization and  reform in Bulgaria, which had  slowed  do\\Til  in  1993, have  been 
making only slow progress since the start of 1994. This was made in the context of 
· the economic programme put in place with the financial support of  the IMF under a . 
new  stand-by arrangement  approved in March  1994.  The  programme's objectives 
·  include  restoring  domestic  and  external  balances · through  a  tightening  of fiscal, 
incomes  and  monetary  policies,  and  accelerating  the  structural  transformation 
process, mainly financial secto·r reform and privatization. 
The implementation of government stabilization policies in the first half of 1994 has 
been  broadly  in  line  with  programme  targets  despite  an  unprecedented  sharp 
.depreciation of  the national currency in the first months of the year.  The exchange 
rate crisis fuelled by political uncertainties, delays in mobilizing international financial 
support and, most importantly, policy slippages during 1993 (the 1993 fiscal deficit is 
estimated to have reached over 13% of GDP, against 7% a year earlier) culminated 
in March 1994, when the lev exchange rate dropped from 37 to 65 Leva per US$ (it 
stabilized  later  at  round  55  Leva  per  US$).  On  the  side  of structural  reform, 
privatization  has  been  accelerated  somewhat,. a  modem bankruptcy  law  has  l;>een 
adopted by Parliament and a clean-up of a large proportion of non-performing bank 
loans has been virtually completed. 
2.  BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Bulgaria's  external  financial  situation  remains  weak,  although  there  have  been 
improvements since the start of 1994. Exports in convertible currencies, which had 
grown in  1992, remained stable in  1993  while imports increased somewhat. Clearly, 
Bulgaria's export performance was  adversely affected  by  the UN sanctions against 
Serbia and Montenegro and by  a substantial real.appreciation ofthe exchange rate 
(until  the  last  months  of the  year).  The  effects  of the  UN  sanctions  and  the 
deteriorating competitiveness were compounded by lack of  official external financing .. 
· folfowing the failure ofBulgaria to secure an arrangement with the IMF. The country 
remained  also  cut off from  private financing  as  it  did  virtually .no  servicing of the 
commercial  debt  inherited · from  the  previous  regime.  Foreign  direct  investment 
remained very low despite a particularly liberal foreign investment law. 
During the first half of 1994, the trade account has improved substantially as exports 
increased by an estimated 13% while the value of  imports has fallen by one-fifth. The 
sharp decline from late 1993  to Spring 1994 in the exchange rate of  the lev is ·likely 
•to·· explain· at least in part the improved trade balance. -26-
3.  FOREIGN  DEBT 
Bulgaria's ·external debt at the end of 1993 was estimated at some US$ 13  billion. It · 
included  over US$  9  billion  owed to  some  300 commercial ·banks,  out of which 
"about  half was made up of interest arrears and  arrears. on short-;term deposits  arid  . 
letters of credit.  In November -1993,  almost four years· after Bulgaria declared  its 
debt moratorium and following  hyo years of negotiations with the Bank Advisory 
Committee,  ari · agreement  in  principle  was·  reached  on  the_  parameters  of a 
. comprehensive debt and debt service reduction deal (DDSR).  The deal expected to 
' improve substantially the country's financial situation in the medium-term was finally 
closed in end-July 1994. 
Under the DDSR operation, a total of  US$ 8.3  billion was tendered for the various 
elements of  the debt restructuring package, i.e. debt buy-backs (at about 25% offace 
value)  and  long-term  securities  (discount  bonds  at  50%  of face·. value,  interest 
reduction  bonds  and  "past  due  interest  bonds").  Overall,  it  is  estimated  that  the 
·  ·.  operation-will result iri a reduction of  Bulgaria's commercial debt by some 46-48%. 
The upfront cost· of the deal,  which is  made up  of debt buy-backs,  interest down-
payments and collateral prepayments on long-term bonds is  over US$ _700  miilion, 
which corresponds to the Central Bank's present international reserves. The IMF arid 
··the World Bank made available specific financing to support the DDSR operation. 
Prior to the closure of  the London Club debt restructuring, Bulgaria als_o  negotiated 
a new official debt rescheduling With  the Paris Club.  The terms of the  1994 Paris 
Club arrangement are comparable to those obtained in December 1992. 
\ -27-
C. THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
l.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
The recession bottomed out in 1993; with real GOP remaining practically qnchanged 
(-0.3%).  After  increasing  from  2.6%  at  end-1992  to  3.5%  at  end-1993,  the 
unemployment rate edged down to 3.2% in July-1994.  Led by the recovery of the 
construction and services sectors, the economy, is expected to grow by abou~ 2-3% · 
in 1994 and by 3-5% next year. 
Following a 8.5% price-jump in January 1993 associated with the introduction of  the 
VAT,  inflation came ·down  rapidly,  ending  1993  at a year-on-year rate of 18.2%. 
Inflation remained subdued in the first half of 1994, with the year-on-year rate falling 
below 10% for the first time since mid-1992. However, the rapid expansion of the 
.. money  .. supply. (M2), which grew by 8.8%{between December 1992 and July  1993, 
risks reigniting inflationary ~ressures in the second half of  the year. 
The rapid  growth of M2  reflects  the impact of the strong foreign  capital inflows, 
which  the  Czech  National  Bank (CNB)  has  only  been  able  to  sterilize  partially 
through open market  operations  and  the  increase  (effective  on 4  August)  of the 
minimum reserve requirements on banks' demand deposits. Regarding fiscal  policy, 
the state budget ended the first half of 1994 with a surplus of  Ck 9. 7 bn (about US$ 
336 mio) and the government is preparing a balanced budget for 1995. 
As far as structural reform is concerned, the second wave of  large-scale privatization 
is underway. As was the case in· the first wave, almost one third of  the assets will be · 
sold· through the voucher method.  The second wave should be completed by end-
1994, by which time 80-90% of the productive capacity of the economy will be in 
private hands.  · 
2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The Czech current account posted in  1993  a surplus of US$  580  mio  (1.8  %  of 
GDP), a good result given the acceleration of  domestic demand and imports and the · 
weakness of  the country's main export markets. The surplus, however, is expected to 
start shrinking  in  the  second  half of 1994  and  disappear or tum into  a  moderate 
deficit in 1995, reflecting a continued strengthening of  domestic demand and the real 
appreciation of  the currency:  . 
The net inflow of FDI slowed down considerably in  1993  (to US$ 517  mio  from 
US$  983  mio  in  1992)  and  the first  half of 1994  (US$  275  mio),  but the Czech 
Republic·has been experiencing a surge in other•capitaL.inflows.-since the third quarter 
of 1993.  Thus,  portfolio investment (mostly equity investment in the Prague Stock 
Exchange and  foreign  acquisition  of Czech  issues  of intematiomil  bonds)  reached 
US$  1062  mio  last  year  an4  US$  530  mio  in  the  first  half of 1994.  The Czech -28-
·  Republic's  access  to  the  international  capital  mark~ts  has · been  reinforced  by 
. successive upgradings of  the country's rating.  In June, Moody's upgraded again the 
Czech Republic's rating (from Baa3 to Baa2), and iri 'Julf'S~'s upgraded its rating 
from BBB- to BBB+.  .  .  . 
· The combination of a heatthy current account and  a strong capital  inflow has  put 
upward pressure on the nominal exchange rate and has resulted in a rapid growth of 
official. foreign exchange reserves, which stood at US$ 5.6 bn at end August..:1994 
compared to US$ 0.7 bn at end-1992. In order to stem the upward pressure .on the 
exchange  rate the CNB  intends  to make  the  crown  fully  convertible · for  current 
.  account transactions and liberalize capital controls in  a phased manner. It has also 
··decided not to Withdraw the remaining tranches of the stand-by credit approved by 
the IMF in Marcil 1993, ancJ  to repay ahead of  schedu~e US$ 471  mio  owed to the 
IMP which were originally scheduled for repayment during .I 996-99. 
··. ·  3.  ···~FOREIGN  UEBT 
Despite a significant growth of convertible .debt in  1993  and the first half of 1994, 
mostly  ·associated  with  strong  foreign  .borrowing  by  Czech  companies  and  .  . 
municipalities,  the Czech Republic  continues  to  enjoy a  low foreign  debt  burden  . 
. Total co1wertible debt increased from US$ 6.9 bn at end-1992 to US$ 8.7 bn at end 
March-1994, but this still implied a relatively low debt/GDP ratio of27.7%. At US$ 
1.4 bn in 1993, total debt service also remains moderate, having even decreased as a 
percentage of  exports (from 9.1% in  1992 to 8.4%). While projections for 1994 and 
1995 point  towards an  increase  in  the debt  and  debt  service  indicators,  they  are 
. expected to remain at reasonable levels.  ·  · 
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D.  ESTONIA 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
Following sharp· output contractions in 1991  (  -12%) and 1992 (  -19%) and a further 
decline  in  the  first  half of 1993,  the  economic  situation  in  Estonia  improved 
considerably in  the  second  half of. 1993  reducing  the rate of  negative growth to 
merely 3%. The economic rebound,.which is expected to produce a positive growth. 
rate  of 4-5%  in  1994,. reflects  the  successful  implementation  of macroeconomic  ·. 
stabilization and structural reforms in Estonia backed by two subsequent IMF stand-
by  programmes  (since  mid-1992),  the  country's  reorientation  towards  Western 
markets  and  support  from  the  international  community.  Despite the reduction  in 
. economic activity over the past years, the official unemployment rate has barely risen 
in the course of  1993 and 1994 and is now at 2%. 
Since 1992, the Estonian authorities have been successful in cutting inflation, despite 
a temporary resurgence of  inflation last winter after strong price increases of  Russian 
imports.  Apart from the virtual completion of  price liberalization by the end of 1992, 
this .  achievement  is  due  to  the  implementation  of· strict monetary  and  incomes 
policies.  The  central  bank  is  also  prohibited  from  extending  credits.  to  the 
Government, which ran a small budget surplus in  1993, following a somewhat larger 
' surplus  in  1992.  But the  government's  net  lending  operations  amounted  to  some 
1.5%  of GDP  in  1993,  which  had  to  be  financed  alrriost  completely  by  foreign 
sources. 
Estonia  has  made  contmumg  progress  on  structural  reform.  In 1993  and  1994, · 
Estonia advanced further in the area of privatization, especially for small enterprises 
of which  over  80%  have  now  been  sold  to  private  owners.  The  Estonian 
Privatization Office was created in  1993  to better coordinate policies towards the 
enterprise sector, and in  1994 a separate depctrtment was established in the Ministry 
of Economy with· responsibility for restructuring state firms  before privatization.  In 
some  cases  the  bankru.ptcy  law  was  applied.  Banking  supervision  was  improved. 
Following the banking crisis of  early 1993, the banking system was restructured. The 
number  of commercial  banks  was ·  reduced.· to  21, ·mostly  through  mergers.  The 
central bank policy of phased increases in  minimum  capital requirements keeps the 
pressure  on  banks  to  consolidate.  Estonia  maintained  liberal  foreign  trade  and 
investment laws. 
2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
In 1992, Estonia's current account unexpectedly showed a surplus of  US$ 83, largely 
···due  .. to"a  .. dynamic  expansion of exports "of-·goodS'·to··industrialized  countries which 
limited the overall trade deficit to  some US$  63  mio.  But in  the course of 1993, 
imports  from  Western  countries  picked  up  sharply,  whereas  exports  to  this  area 
slowed down considerably due to increasing domestic demand pressures, diminished -30-
opportunities for re-exports of FSU goods and a diversion of exports towards the 
.-,Fsu_,..;This·tesulted in. a trade· deficit-with the non-FSU area-(US$  107) ten times  _ 
-larger than in: 1992. One major reason for the redirection-of  exports to the West was-
the sharp -real  appreciation of the ruble in  the course of the second half of 1993, 
-shifting Estonia's trade balance with the FSU from  a  deficit  of US$  51  mio  to a _ 
~urplus of  US$ 15  mio.  Estoni~'s overall traoe deficit widened to US$ 142 .mio arid 
-the cur:rent account surplus shrank to US$ 8. 5 mio despite an increased surplus in the 
services  account.  It is  lllcely  that  the  strengthening  of domestic  demand  and  the 
gradual  reduction  of ·  the  international·  competitiveness  have  led- to  a  further-
deterioration of  the current account iri 1994. 
.  - . 
The capital  account surplus observed in  1992  (US$  120  mio)  expanded further in 
1993 to US$ 148 mio despite the fact that in  1992 the· capital account had benefited 
exceptionally from the restitution of  gold of US$  140 mio. The main reason for the 
improvement in  1993  was .the· sharp increase of foreign direct investment from US$ 
58  mio  in  1992 to US$  144  mio  which was supported by  Estonia's liberal  trade, 
· · foreign exchange -and investment laws and the ~tability of  its currency (pegged to the 
D-Mark under a currency board system since June 1992). It permitted the Bank of 
Estonia to accumulate reserves in the order of  US$ 200 mio in  1992 and some US$ 
157 nlio in 1993, to a level equivalent to 4.8 months of  goods imports. 
.  . 
Conditions  for  ongoing  capital  inflows  have  remained  good  in  1994;  in  August 
Estonia accepted the obligations. of  the IMF Article VIII,  i.e~ basically to refrain from 
imposing  restrictions  on  the  'making  of  payments  and  transfers  for  ~urrent 
international. transactions. 
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
In the course of 1993, Estonia's external' debt increased from  US$ 38 mio  to US$ 
i40 mio  (some 7% of GDP).  US$ 46 million  hereof is  due to  purchases from  the 
Fund. Debt service stabilized at around $20 mio in  1992 and  1993, with .the ratio to 
··exports of  goods and non-factor services declining from 3.2% to 1.8%.  .  -- 31  -
E. HUNGARY 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION_ 
In spite of  a 4% growth in industrial production, real GDP declined by 2.3% in 1993, 
reflecting a sharp fall in both agricultural output and exports. After a peak in March · 
1993, the unemployment rate has steadily declined to 11% in August 1994. In 1994 
GDP is expected to grow by 1-2% but, with the strengthening of  domestic demand 
being  constrained  by  a  weak  balance  of payments  situation,  GDP  could  again 
stagnate in 199 5. 
Little progress  ~as made on the inflation front in  1993, with average CPI inflation 
reaching  22.5%;  close to the  1992 level  (23%).  Increases itt  indirect taxes and  a 
· faster devaluation of  the forint will prevent a reduction of end-1994 inflation below · 
20%. 
The  new  socialist;..liberal  government  announced  in  August  the  adoption  of a 
supplementary budget for 1994 designed to keep the consolidated deficit at Ft 330 
bn (or about 7%) of  GDP, do'wn from the Ft 3  90 bn deficit that was being forecast~d 
on recent trends. In recent talks with the new government, the IMF has insisted on 
the need to reduce the budg~t deficit to about 3% ofGDP next year ifiMF financing 
is to resmpe, but the government's budget guidelines for 1995 point towards a 7-S% 
deficit. 
Regarding the structural reforms, a new bank consolidation scheme was launched in 
December 1993,.involving a two-step recapitalization of  the major Hungarian banks. 
through the tral)sfer of state bonds.  The new government,  however,  will  probably 
. scale down the scheme and give priority to bank privatization.  After a slowdown in 
1993, the privatization process almost came to a standstill in the first half of 1994. 
The new govenment plans to revitalize and revise the privatization strategy. 
2.  THEBALANCEOFPAYMENTS 
Hungary's current account suffered a sharp deterioration in  1993,  reaching a deficit 
of US$ 3.5 bn (almost 10% of GDP); Having amounted to almost US$ 2 bn in the 
first half of 1994, the current account deficit is projected to again exceed US 3bn this 
year. The weakness of  the current account and speculation against the forint led the 
authorities to devalue the currency by 8% on 5 August,  thus deviating from their 
policy of  small, regular devaluations aimed at stabilizing the real exchange rate. 
Despite  the  very  high  current  account  deficit,  official  foreign'  exchange  reserves 
-.;·expanded-rapidly-in 1993, reaching US$,7-bn atthe end.o£.the-yeai, up from US$ 4.4 
bn at end-1992.- This was made possible by a continuing strong ·net inflow of FDI 
(which reached a record ofUS$ 2.3  bn) and by the placement by the National Bank 
ofHungary (NBH) ofUS$ 4.5 bn in international bonds in  1993. 
'  .. . -32-
Although a further US$  1.5 bn in international bonds were raised by the NBH ~n the 
,:,first half of  1994; lower.inflows ofFDI and substantial early repayments of  external. 
' - debt have resulted in a· decrease in official foreign exchange reserves from a peak of 
US$ 7.5 bn inJanuary 1994 to US $6,6 bn at end-August 1994:  -
Hungary  has  a  15  month,  SDR 340  mio  stand-by loan  agreement  with  the. IMF 
ending in December 1994. However, reflecting both the comfortable level· ofofficial 
foreign exchange reserves and non-compliance with some of the programme target 
the government has only withdrawn the first tranche of  the stand:by credit. The IMF  · 
is  currently discussing ·with  the Hungarian authorities  oil the inain elements  of an 
economic programme to be supported by the resumption ofiMF lending  .. 
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
The result of  the  intem~tional borrowing programme of the NBH ha~ been a rapid 
· growth of.gross·foreign debt.  Gross convertible foreign  debt increased from  US$ 
21.5 bn at end-1992 to US$ 24.6 bn at end-1993 and US$ 26.6 bn at end-June 1994. 
Reflecting the gap between the current account deficit and net inflows of FDI,  net 
foreign debt has shown a similar increase (from US$  13.1  bn  at end-1992 to US$ 
. 18.1 bn at end-iune 1994). The structure of  external debt, however, has continued to 
improve, with the proportion of  medium- and long-term debt increasing from 89.8% 
at end-1992 to 92.4% at end-June 1994. 
Total debt service amounted to US$ 4.3 bn in  1993, practically the same level as in 
1992. However,•with exports estimated to have fallen by 20% last year, debt service 
increased  in  percent  of merchandise  exports  from  43.9%  to  53.1%.  J'he  early 
repayments  made  .by  the  NBS  have  significantly  reduced  the  concentration  of 
repayments  expected  for  1995  and  1996.- Repayments  in  1995  and  1996,  wliich  ·. 
would have otherwise reached  US$· 3.4 bn and US$  3.9  bn  respectively,  are  now 
projected to amount to US$ 3. bn and U~$  3  .1  bn. -33-
F.  ISRAEL 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
GDP  increased  by  3.5%  only  in  1993,  the  lowest growth rate  since  1989  ..  The . 
·closure of the Occupied Territories in  the second quarter slowed down economic 
activity,  but an  incre~e was· registered towards the end of the year,  following the· 
peace agreement with the Palestinians.  While  growth in the early 90s  was driven· 
mainly by immigrant inflows,  privatisation and deregulation is now creating a basis 
for more sust~inable long-term growth.  · 
The  government  budget  deficit  was  reduced  to  3.6%  of GDP,  following  an 
acceleration of privatisation and  a reduction in  the housing  programme and  other 
subsidies  for  immigrants,  including  unemployment  benefits.  Budget revenue  from 
,... privatisation. ,was  only  US$  250  million  in  1992,  which· is  very  small  given  the 
importance of state enterprises in  the economy.  The  acceleration of privatisation, 
., announced in August 1993, boosted privatisation revenue to nearly US$ 1 billion by 
end  1993.  For 1994, privatisation revenues are expected to reach US$ 1.5 billion or 
more than 2% ofGDP. 
Unemployment continued to fall, from 11.2% end 1992 to 9% end 1993, as the wave 
of immigration from  Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union of the early  1990s 
.came to an end. Recent_inimigrants were gradually integrated into the economy. The 
closure of the Occupied Territories in the second quarter facilitated this process as 
immigranrs replaced Palestinian workers. 
Inflation accelerated sharply to 16% p.a. in the first quarter of  19~3. Monetary policy  · 
has been tightened, with an increase in the Central Bank refinancing rate driving up 
short-term interest  rates.  By July,  inflationary  pressures had  decreased  sufficiently 
and monetary policy was eased again. At the end of 1993, inflation had slowed down 
to 11.3% p.a. which is still somewhat above the initial target of 10%. 
2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Foreign trade was further liberalised in  1993 ·with the cancellation of a 2% import 
duty surcharge, a 2% export subsidy and travel taxes, all of  which constituted trade 
restrictions  under the  GATT  rules.  The  effective unification of the exchange rate  .  . 
took place in July, for the first time in Israel's history. In September, Israel accepted 
the  obligations  concerning  the  convertibility  of the  shekel  for  current  account 
transactions under article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement. The Central Bank 
of  Israel maintains a "crawling peg" exchange rate system with a target depreciation 
· ·  ·  ·"rate  .... announced ··by  the · Central  Bank; ·  in·-line'YWith ... expected ··inflation,  and  a  2% 
variation . allowed  around  the  targeted  exchange  rate.  The  announced  rate  of 
depreciation was reduced  in  July from  8%  to 6%,  in  line with the expected slow-
down in the inflation rate.  . .  , 
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FolloWing the end ofthe Gulf War,  external trade started to pick up again in  1992 
····· andthis trend-continued in  1993. The increase in exports, .estimated at i2% in dollar. 
. .  "terms~ was a strong driving force for grqwth in 1993 ..  Industrial exports increased by  . 
·18%, of which three quarters went to,non-OECD countries.- But imports increased 
equally fast. The current account moved from a small US$ 0 .1. billion surplus m  1992 _ 
to a {)S$  1.2 billion deficit in  19~3.  Private capital inflo:ws  mcreased as  monetary 
policy was tightened and  interest rates increased.  Long-term capital inflows  grew 
strongly from a net outflow in 1992 to a US$ 2.2 billion inflow in 1993 . 
.  Official foreign exchange reserves reached the satisfactory level of  US$ 6.4 billion at 
.end-1993, or the equivaleni of2.4 months ofimports.  .  . 
3~  FOREIGN DEBT 
The US$ 10 billi.on credit guarantees obtained froin the US government in 1992 have 
·-~enabled the. authorities to draw on medium and long-term credit lines for investment 
projects.  Total external debt increased  to US$  36.1  billion,  of which  nearly  three 
·.  quarters was public sector debt.  The debt service to exports ratio improved slightly  . 
as export growth was_strong in 1993 .. -35-
G.·.  LATVIA 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
Following  severe  output contractions  in  1991  (-8.3%)  and  1992  (-33.8%),- the 
Latvian economy bottomed out in the course of 1993 in which output contracted by 
some 12% for the year as a whole. For 1994, a GOP growth in the order of  4-5% is 
expected.  After  rising  from  2.3%  to  5.8%  in  the  course  of 1993,  the  official 
unemployment rate increased further to 6.4% in August 1994. At the same time, real· 
wages rose by 12% from the first quarter 1993 to the_first quarter 1994. 
Until  Summer  1993,  the Latvian authorities  succeeded  in  bringing  down inflation 
significantly~ at the end of 1993, the level of consumer- prices was 35% higher than 
one year earlier (compared to 960% in  1992). Apart from the virtual completion of 
. price-liberalization by the end of 1992, this was due to the tight stance of monetary 
policy  (since the monetary reform of July  1992),  as well  as  of fiscal  and  incomes 
policies. In late 1993  and early  1994, however, inflation rates picked up.  The VAT 
rise of 1 November contributed to this development. But the major cause is likely to 
have been the intervention of the Bank of  Latvia in the foreign exchange market in 
order to contain the ,appreciation of the national  currency (lats)  in  response to the 
substantial capital inflow. 
In 1993, the Latvian budget was in surplus (at 1% of  GOP~ or, if net lending of the 
Government is taken into account, at 0.6% of GOP). This was not only due to tight 
budget control,  but also  to higher profit and  value  added tax revenues  and  lower 
unemployment  benefits  than  previously  estimated.  Despite substantial  increases of 
pensions and public sector wages on 1 November 1993, the budget was in balance in 
the first quarter of 1994 (-1% ofGDP if  net lending is taken into account). For 1994 
a deficit of 1.7% ofGDP is envisaged (4% ofGDP, counting net lending). 
Latvia also advanced further in a number of  areas of structural reform. In particular, 
significant  progress  was  made · towards  restructuring  and  privatizing  the  former 
commercial branches of  the Bank of  Latvia and towards rehabilitating and eventually 
privatizing the State Savings Bank.  Banking supervision was also  strengthened.  In 
addition,  progress  was  made  in  land  restitution  and  privatization  of small-scale 
enterprises.  In  February  1994,  several  privatization  laws  were  adopted  and 
subsequently the Privatization Agency and the State Property Fund were established· 
to supervise,  respectively,  privatization and  those enterprises remaining under state 
control. This is likely to speed up large-scale privatization. 
2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Latvia's  current  account  position  in  1992  and  especially  1993  were  considerably 
better than expected under the first  IMF  programme.  The ' surplus  increased  from 
US$ 21  mio in  1992 to US$  193  mio  in  1993, compared to estimated deficits in the -36-
order ofUS$ 90 mio and US$ 240 mio, respectively. To some extent,  ~here may still. 
·''~be-a problem-ofunder-reporting of  imports from the former~Soviet republics,-but the 
situation also. reflects a better than expected performance in the services aceount and 
dynamic exports. The reorientation of  trade towards Western markets was halted in 
1993, with exports to the CIS. and Baltics increasing by 8% in volume terms, while 
expanding 9% to the rest of  the world. ';fhis reflects on the one hand the very strong. 
real appreciation of  the Latvian currency compared to the· dollar since July 1992. On 
the other hand,  it  is  the consequence of a  real·depreciatiori of the lat against  the 
rouble  since  mid-1993  which  almost  completely  reversed · the  Latvian  loss  in 
competitiveness vis-a-vis Russia that had occurred since September 1992. It appears · 
that. possibilities for re-export of FSU products (in particular energy) to the West-
have  diminished with· these developments.  The  strengthening of domestic  demand 
and  dirrl.inished  international competitiveness  should  lead to a  d~terioration of the 
current account in 1994. 
As  a _consequence  of the  strong  capital  inflow  in  1993,  the  Bank  of Latvia 
accumulated a large amount of reserves (some US$  356 mio),  increasing its gross 
level to some US$ 518 mio or an equivalent of 5.9 in months of  total imports (from 
1.8 at the end of 1992).  · 
Since July  1994,. Latvia assumes Article VITI status at the IMF; i.e. in particular that 
it undertakes to refrain from  imposing restrictions· on the maldng  of payments and 
transfers for current international transactions.  - · 
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
Latvia's external debt increased from US$_ 65 mio to some US$ 300 mio (about 10% 
of GDP).  Compared to  1992,  the debt' service fell  by  one third to US$ 10 mio  in 
·1993, with the ratio to merchandise exports declining from 2% to 1%.  · 
''  "' -37-
H.  LITHUANIA 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
In Lithuania; output contraction seems to_ have halted· at the end of 1993,  and the 
overall GDP decline is  estimated at 16% for the whole- year, following declines of 
· ·13% in 1991 and 38% in·1992. Th_e official unemployment rate rose only moderately· 
in the course of 1993  and reached a mere 1.6% at the end of  1993, above which it 
did  not ·rise  in the first  eight months of 1994.  However,  hidden unemployment is 
· estimated at some 7%. 
The Lithuanian authorities have reduced inflation in  1993, even though less rapidly 
than  the other two Baltic  States.  The  increase  in  consumer prices  which  reached 
1163%  at the end  of 1992  fell  to  189%  at  end-1993.  Strict  incomes  and  fiscal 
,  ·  ... policies throughout the year, combined with a monetary policy that was tightened in 
Spring 1993, contributed to the strong deceleration of iriflation during the Summer. 
Towards the end of  the year, monetary expansion picked up slfarply and contributed 
to a  rise of  inflation as the central bank intervened in the foreign exchange to prevent 
a strong appreciation of  the litas resulting from capital inflows.  Since 1 April 1994, 
Lithuania  has  a  currency  board  which  ties  monetary  expansion to the  balance  of 
payments. 
The Lithuanian authorities managed to keep public expenditures under tight control 
in  1993  and  strengthened  revenues  through  trade  reforms  and  an  increase  in  the 
general sales tax, such that the budget was for the third year in a row in surplus ( 1% 
-of GDJ;»).  However, if government lending is taken into account, there was a fiscal 
deficit  of 4.6% of GDP,  financed  through  foreign  assistance.  For 199,4,  a  deficit 
..  target of  about ·1% of  GDP has been set, (  4. 9% accounting for net lending). 
Regarding  structural reform,  Lithuania also  continued to progress in  a  number of  · 
areas  as  foreseen . under  the  IMF  stand-by  arrangement  of  October  .1993. 
Privatization advanced further;  so far,  90% of small firms have been. privatized and 
nearly  90%  of privatizations  of  residential  property  by  occupants  has  been 
completed.  There were also  additional  price  liberalization  measures,  including  the 
abolition of profit margins. Progress in banking reform was relatively slow in  1993. 
But following  the  adoption of the currency  board,  both the  central  bank and  the 
commercial bank laws are now being discussed in Parliament. 
2.  1HE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The  current account shifted  from  a .surplus  of US$  62  mio  in.  1992  (originally  a 
t.:deficit""ofUS$160 mio had been expected)into  .. an estimated·deficit ofUS$ 192 mio 
in 1993 (6.2% of  GDP). A major factor contributing to this recent deterioration was 
Russia's move to world market levels for its energy exports to Lithuania in·Fall 1992. 
The trade balance swung from  a US$ 65  mio  surplus to a deficit of US$ 267 mio. .  -38-
The reorientation of  trade continued in 1993 and 1994. It is expected that the current· 
..  -account·will deteriorate further in  199~ to reach a deficitin-the. order  of  US$ 330 
.mio (some 5% ofGDP). 
The deterioration of  the current account· in ·1993  was accompanied by a substantial  ~ 
improvement in the capital account from a surplus of US$ 90 mio in  1992 to US$ ·  · 
313 mio in 1993. Foreign direct investmentincreased from US$ 10 mio to US$ 23 
mio,. but remained low· in comparison with that ·of the oiher. two Baltic States. The 
inflow of official transfers and medium- and long.;.term loans more ·than doubled to · 
reach in total some US$ 245 mio in 1993.  This capital inflow permitted the central· 
baltk to accumulate US$ 304 mio in reserves, bringing the stock up to US$ 410 mio .. 
In terms of  months of  imports, this signifies a negligible ~ecrease from 2.6 ifl1992 to 
2.4 in 1993, reflecting the rise in imports. 
Since July  1994, Lithuania assumes Article VIll statUs at the IMF; i.e.  in particular 
that it undertakes to refrain from imposing restrictions on the making of payments 
··  ' and transfers for current international transactions. 
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
In 1993, Lithuania's external debt stock increased from .US$ 99 mio to US$ 345 mio 
(some 11% ofGDP) and the debt servicejncreased from a mere US$ 2 nlio in  1992 
to US$ 15 mio (0.7% exports of  goods aildservices).  · -39-
I. OTHER NEWLY INDEPENDENT ST~TES-
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
The situation in the other Newly Independenf States (NIS) varies considerably.  All 
the  former  republics  have  suffered  in  .1992-1993  from  the  weakening  of old 
-.  structures which have not yet been replaced by market-oriented institutions and the .. 
collapse  of inter-republican  trade  links ..  The  decline  in  trade  among  the  former 
. republics (probably 20-30% a year since  1992) has had serious knock-on effects on  ··. 
·  · output. L.~ose financial policies in many NIS compounded the adverse effects of  the · 
external shocks. Inflation remains very high through()ut the area,  and several states · 
are clearly in hyperinflation. 
Far-reaching  economic  reform  has  begun  in  most  NIS,  and  some  of them  have 
..  already.made.~considerable strides  in  the transition  to  market-based  system  while 
implementing more strict financial policies. Several NIS have received or were about  .  . 
to  receiv~  financia~  support  from  the  IMF:  Kyrgyzstan,  Moldova,  Kazakhstan, 
Belarus and,  in· October 1994, Ukraine have concluded financing  arrangement with 
the Fund, and more such arrangements (Georgia, Armenia, and, again, Belarus) were 
expected  to  be  concluded  in  late  1994  or  early  1995.  Also,  progress  towards 
comprehensive reforms had been made in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. 
2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The balance of-payments situation of the area is extremely weak, with probably the 
exception of  Turkmenistan. This is particularly the case in the short run. Large trade 
deficits with Russia and  Turkmenistan,  linked. primarily to higher prices for energy 
· -and  raw materials make the· current account position of .number of the new states 
particularly precarious. The financial credibility of  most NIS is further aggravated by 
lack of  international reserves.  ' 
In a longer term perspective,  the new  states present rather variable profiles.  Some 
have  considerable  hard  currency  earning  potential  (Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan, 
Azerbaijan) and industrial capacity, Others are clearly close to developing countries 
ang  will  therefore  strongly  depend  on  external  assistance.  Armenia,  Georgia and. 
Kyrgyzstan have already been made eligible to highly concessionallending. 
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
The NIS have achieved in  1993 substantial progress in clarifYing their position vis-a-
v~s-the"'question  .. of the foreign debt of  .. the former..So.\liet.Uni.on:_Initially (at the end 
of 1991), the former republics were made jointly and  severally responsible for such 
debt.  The-Memorandum of Understanding  setting  forth  the  principle  of joint and 
several  liability  was  signed  on  28  October · 1991.  The  April  1993  Paris  Club -40-
agreement with Russia was·accompanied by a change in legal arrangements on debt ·  .. 
setvicing·,within the FSU making in fact Russia the sole actuaLmanager qfthe _debt. 
· Accordingly, the creditors acknowledged that the so  .. called ·"zero-option". agreements 
concluded by Russia with otherformer republics (by virtue of which Russia takes -
oyer the full amount ofthe·ex..;Soviet debt; in exchange for. the full amount of  the ex-· 
Sovie~ external assets) discharge them of  any setvicing of  such debt.  ·· 
A number of Nis (notably Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan) have attracted· since  . 
their  independence  new  credits ·from the West.  However,  the  bulk of the  NIS 
. external debt is owed to Russia and Turkmenistan. This debt results from b~ances of 
the  ex-republics
1  Central  Banks with the  Central  Bank of Russia and  arrears  or 
, energy  shipments.  In  1993~  ~ussia concluded. with  all  the  NIS  .(with  the  only 
exception of  Turkmenistan) agreements rescheduling its claims over a period ranging 
. from 1994-1997 (Azer!)aijan, Georgia, Moldova) io 2000-2007 (Belarus). More such 
agreements were expected in 1994 as trade arrears were continuing to build up with 
the two energy-exporting NIS. in 1994.  · 
/ 
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J.ROMANIA 
. 1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
In the course of 1993, the decline in real GDP was reversed. Annual GDP growth ·· 
reached  1%  in  1993  and  is  expected to remain  around that low level throughout 
1994  and  1995  due  to the ·slow implementation  of reforms  in  state  enterprises. · 
Growth will be fuelled mainly by exports. 
The authorities finally agreed on a new programme with the lMF at the end of 1993 
and  started to implement a  stricter monetary policy:  As  a  result,  inflation slowed . 
down considerably  to 2.6%  per month  in  June  1994  and  is  likely  to.  be  kept  at 
double-digit levels in 1994, down from over 300% end 1993. The increase in interest 
rates to positive levels in real terms early 1994 contributed to the stabilisation of  the 
.. LeLat-around .1650-1700 Lei/US$ and  allowed the unification of  offici~ and  open 
market exchang-e rates into a single market-determined rate. Nominal interest rates at 
National :Sank.credit. auctions decreased to 92% p.a. by July 1994. 
The govemmc:mt budget was more or less in balance in 1993. In 1994, the deficit is 
expected to remain low around 2.5% ofGDP. 
The  agreement  with  the  lMF  gave  a · new- impulse  to  state  enterprise  reform.  . 
Enterprises  with  large  losses  and/or  large  arrears  have  been  isolated  from  the 
· financial  system _and·  financial-recovery-plans· have been implemented.  But there is 
little progress· in the privatisation of  large and medium sized enterprises. A new mass 
privatisation scheme has been announced for the end of 1994.·  Prudential regulations 
and stricter control of bank' portfolio's have been introduced but little progress has 
been made with respect to the privatisation of  banks. 
2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
The  depreciation of the Lei  between  end-1993  and  early-1994  has  improvedo the 
competitiveness of  the Romanian economy. Imports are expected to stabilise at close 
to the  1993  level  as  domestic  demand  remains  weak.  Exports will  grow reflecting 
increased  competitiveness  and  easier access  to  markets  with  the  approval  of the · 
(Interim) Europe Agreement  with the European Union and  the granting of Most-
Favoured-Nation status in the United States import regime. 
The trade balance and current account continued to improve in the first half of 1994. 
The  current  account  deficit  for  that  period  amounted  to  US$  166  million  only, 
compared to a US$  1.6  billion  deficit for  the whole of 1993.  The capital account 
,t!registered,:a'tsurplus of more than ·US$·-;700.million.,(incb··lMF·:financing facilities) 
during the first half of 1994, compared to a US$ 1.2 billion surplus for the whole of 
1993.  The new agreement with the IMF,  approved by the Executive Board _in  May 
1994, is likely to trigger a new stream of  official aid inflows into Romaftia. Access to ·~ 42-
private financial markets is· still·Iimited. Direct foreign investment inflows remain very 
.  ~low  as·large-sc~e privatisations have not really started yet. 
As a result of  these favourable balance of  payments developments, foreign currency- . 
reserves at the National Bank·soaredfrom a very low US$ 40 million at end-1993 to·.·. 
over US$ 800 million by mid-1994.  Most of this  increase is  due to a  shift  from 
fore,igii  currency  deposits  to ·Lei  deposits  in  the  commercial  banking . system, 
triggered by the strong increase in real interest rates. 
3.  FOREIGN  DEBT' 
Total external debt increased rapidly from Virtually zero in 1989 to US$ 4.4 billion or 
16% of GDP  end  1993  and  debt  service accounted  in  1993  for  6.2% of current 
r~ceipts.  As foreign  investment .  inflows  are  unlikely  to increase rapidly,  official 
· . medium  and  long  term ·loans  will  remain  the  principal  source  of finance  for  the 
,.current :account. deficit and, consequently, the growth of the debt stock is projected 
to CO:{ltinue.  The external debt service ratio is projected to increase slowly in the next 
few years. -43-
K. RUSSIA 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
. Russia's  economic  perfomumce,·  particularly .  disappointing  in  1992  and  1993, 
remained weak in the beginning of 1994. The fall in output in the first half of  the year 
is reported to -17% (it was -19%,in 1992 and -12% in 1993). ·Industrial p~oduction 
has been contracting even faster (-26% in the first half of 1994) and investment has 
· probably fallen  to less than half qf its  1989 level.  Living  standards have declined 
markedly.  Also,  progress  with  putting  in  place  the  legislative  and  institutional 
framework  for  a  market  economy  and  structural  reform  has  been  slow  in  many 
respects. In particular, enterprise restructuring has not been implemented at the same 
- pace as  privatization of state assets.  Indeed,  a large share of small  enterprises has 
been privatized and  a mass privatization programme was developed; by  mid-1994, 
•close·to two•  thirds of  enterprises had been privatized.  · 
In May 1993, agreement was reached betWeen the government and the Central Bank 
to reduce credit emission,  increase· interest rates and  limit  the budget deficit.  The 
measures implemented since then brought down money supply growth, which helped 
to reduce monthly inflation gradually to less than 10% since March 1994 (and even 
less than 5% in August). These advances in stabilization allowed the IMF to agree in 
April to the disbursement ofthe second US$ 1.5 billion instalment under its Systemic 
Transformation Facility (the first instalment had been paid in July 1993), and to start 
discussions on a stand-by programme. Yet, financial conditions remain fragile',  as the 
extreme exchange ·rate volatility in October 1994 demonstrated; budgetary conditions 
in particular are a cause for concern. 
c· 
\. 
2.  THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
Russia's external situation has remained weak since 1992, reflecting the impact of  the 
.  systemic changes, the disruptions of  traditional trade and payments arrangemen~s and 
domestic  macro-economic  policies.  However,  during  this  period  Russia's  gross 
foreign exchange reserves increased to clo.se to US$ 5 billion or about 1 months of 
imports by October 1994 (they were virtually nil at the end of 1991). 
In the period 1992-firsthalf of 1994, official balance of payments support from the 
West (bilateral trade credits and grants and  credit from  the International  ~inancial 
Institutions)  approached  US$  30  billion.  However,  owing  to  a  weaker  export 
performance,  a  bunching  of debt  servicing  obligations  and  large  recorded  or 
-unrecorded  capital  flight  (estimated  to  some  US$  10  billion,  in  1992,  probably 
somewhat less in 1993-1994), this did not preyent either a sharp reduction of  imports 
or a dramatic increase in debt arrears. -44-
3.  FOREIGN DEBT 
.  . 
'At the end of 1993, total foreign debt of  the former·soViefUnion approached US$ 
84 billion, up  .from US$ 79 billion a  year--earlie~ and US$ 67 billion two ~s  earlier;  · 
··  Out of  this amoynt, .  more than US$ 70 billion are medium- and long-term liabilities 
(agaUist US$ 54 billion at the end of 1991).  Some 65% of Jiiedium- and long-term 
··.debt_ is. owed to-official creditors (up from 45% at the end of 199l). The Russian  .  .  .  . 
debt still remains relatively modest in view of the size of the economy, about one-
quarter ofGDP. In 1993, total scheduled debt servicing (US$ 20 billiot:t) represented 
almost 30% of  total exports and over 40% of  exports outside the FSU. 
In December  1,991-January  1992,  the  official  and  private  creditors of  the former 
Soviet Union agreed with the former republics on a deferral of  some US$ 7.1  billion 
·(principal repayment obligations on credits extended to the USSR-before 1991). The 
deferral proved, however, insufficient since Russia, the only former Soviet. republic 
to h~ve made any debt servicing in 1992 (ihe payments were supposed to be made by 
· '·"all'the·NIS·madejointly· and severally responsible for the debt), was unable to meet 
the still  substantial obligations.  Russia's  debt  p~ments in  1992  amounted to only 
US$ 1.6 billion.  As a result, arrears increased dramatically; ·at the end of1992, they 
approachedJ.JS$12 billion.  ·· 
In early April  1993, a generous debt rescheduling agreement was reached with the 
Paris Club that reduced the official debt  servicing in  1993 -by  some US$  15  billion. 
The agreement was this time concluded with Russia alone, making it the sole actual 
manager of  the ex-Soviet debt: the agreement,was well beyond the ·deferrals agreed 
previously; it provided for a medium-term deferral of  part of  moratorium interest. In 
early June  1994, Russia negotiated a new Paris  Club  deal.  The terms of this new 
rescheduling covering• maturities fal_ling due in 1994 are broadly comparable to those ... 
ofthe 1993 deal.  · 
Also,  In July 1.993,. Russia reached  an  agreement  in  principle with the. commercial 
banks on a -long-term rescheduling of  the ex-Soviet commercial -debt  (US$ 24-26 · 
billion·is owed to  some 600 banks). In parallel with progress in the negotiations with 
· the coll1Iilercial creditors, the price pf  the Russian debt on the secondary market ihat _ 
had been below 20% atthe beginning of 1993, rose gradually (by early December) to 
some 55%. H<;>wever,  subsequent delays in the final agreement due to unsettled legal 
issues (  orily cleared in September 1994) and Russia's failure to make· the payment of 
part of  interest arrears due in 1993  (US$ 450 million) led to.a new fall of  the price in 
early 1994 to 35%.  "  ·  · -45-
L. THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
1.  GENERAL ECONOMIC SITUATION 
Slovak GOP  declined  by  4.1%  in  1993,  implying  the  fourth  consecutive  year of 
recession.  Real  activity,  however,  has  been  strengthening since the start of 1994. 
Thus,  real  GOP  grew  by·  4.4%  year-on-year -in  the  first  half of 1994  and 
unemployment seem to have- stabilized at around 14.5%. After accelerating in  1993 
(to 25.1% in December) as result of  increases in indirect taxes and the devaluation of 
-the Slovak· crown,  inflation has been on a downward trend since the beginning of 
1994, with year-on year CPI inflation declining to 13.5% in July. 
The reduction of inflation is being supported by tight macroeconomic policies.  Net 
domestic assets fell  by  9% in the first  half of the year and broad money  remain~ 
practically  .unchanged  in  nominal  terms.  Regarding  fiscal  policy,  the  general 
government deficit is  estimated to have been roughly in  balance at end-June.  This 
compares  with  a  general  government  deficit  of 7.5%  of GOP  in  1993  and  is 
consistent with the government•s targets of reducing the deficit to 4% of GOP  in 
1994 and to 3% of  GOP in  1995. These targets are part of  the economic programme 
for  1994/95  agreed with the IMF  and  supported by  a 20-month,  SOR 115.8  mio 
stand-by arrangement,  a second purchase (of SOR 64.34  mio)  from  the  Systemic 
·- Transformation-Facility (STF), and  complementary macro-financial assistance -from 
the_EU/G-24 in the amount ofup to US$ 243 mio. 
, In the area of  structural reform, the privatiztion process was given a new impulse in 
1994  with  the.  launching  of a  second  wave  of voucher  privatization  and  new 
measures  in  the  area  of banking  sector  reform.  However,  the  new  government 
emerging from  the  September  1994  general  elections,  has yet tQ  clarify' its future 
strategy regarding structural reform. 
2.  THEBALANCEOFPAYMENTS 
Slovakia suffered from  a weak balance  of payments in  1993.  The current account 
recorded a deficit of3.9% of  GOP, inflows offoreign direct investment continued to  . 
be ofllttle significance (US$ 100 mio.) and  specula~ion about a devaluation resulted 
in  a  considerable  outflow  of short-term  capital.  This  was  reflected  in  a  very 
vulnerable  foreign  exchange  reserve  position  throughout  the  year,  with  official 
reserves never exceeding 1 month of  imports. 
The  programme  for  1994/95,  however,  projects  a  gradual  strengthening  of the 
·balance of payments.  The current account deficit is  expected to decline to 2.5% of 
?GOP thiS"year and remain at a similar level  in:''l995;,~disbursements of official loans 
are expected to reach about US$ 450 mio in both 1994 arid  1995, and the support of 
the  international  community  for  the  govemments•s  economic  programme  should 
facilitate the placement by the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) of some US$ 500 -46-
mio  in  intematiomil  bonds  in · I994/95.  Reflecting  these  f~ctors,  official  foreign 
• exchange reserves are targeted to increase to about US$_.1.4  bn_ (or 2.4 months of 
imports) by end-I995. 
· Recent  trends ·in  the current .account; ·the· capital  account  and  foreign  exchange . 
reserves are consistent with these projections.  The balance· of the clearing account 
~th  .  the  Czech  Republic,  for  example,  has ·moved· from  a ··large  deficit  at -the 
beginning  of the  year  to  a  consideral:ile  surplus.  Also,  in  late ·July  the  NBS 
successfully placed a US$- 250 mio·-bond. in the Samurai ·market. This was facilitated 
by the assignment by the Japan ·Bond Research Institute in July of  an investment rate 
rating (BBB). Together with the disbursement of  the first tranche of  the IMF stand-
by· and the second purchase from the STF,  and a regained confidence in the Slovak 
currency, all this has resulted in an increase in official foreign exchange reserves from 
US$  372  mio  at  end-February  to  US$  I  bn  (6r  1.8  months of impo,rts)  in  mid-
August.  The total reserves of the banking system have risen  over the same period 
from US$ 1.39 bn to US$ 2.27 bn. 
Within the Th1F programme, the governinent is committed to lifting by end-I994 the 
.I 0% temporary surcharge on consumer imports introduced last March and to make 
progress towards achieving full  current account convertibility so as to reach "Article 
VIII status" at the IMFby 1 January, 1996. 
3._  FOREIGN DEBT -
Slovakia inherited from the Czechoslovak federation a very low external debt. While 
extemai debt and debt service ratios are expected to deteriorate in the coming years, 
they will remain at relatively low levels.  The convertible currency debt to GDP ratio 
is  projected  to increase froin  30.5%  at end-1993  to about 40% at end-I995  and  ·, 
· stabilize at 43-45% after I997. Convertible debt service as a· percentage of  exports of 
goods and services, for its part, is expected to increase from 8.9% in  1993 to II% in 
1995 and.remain approximately at that level thereafter. - l7 -
II-F-3  Country  Risk Indicators 
Last  update  -
0  25/10/9(  Country:  Algeria 
1991  1992  1993 
Real  GOP  grC:...t:h  rate  (in  I)  -2,80  2,20  -1,80 
Industrial production  (  I  change)  1,00  -2,50  (a) 
Unemployment  rate  (end of period)  20,20  21,90  (a) 
Inflation rate  (Dec/Dec)  22,80  32,10  20,50 
Exchange  rate  (dinars per USDl  (end  of period)  21,39  22,78  2t,12 
Nominal  effective exchange rate  (change Qt/Q()  (- •  depreciation)  -5o,oo  1,00  7,90. 
Real  effective exchange rate  (change 0'/Q()  (- •  depreciation)  -39,50  27,00  U,2D 
\ 
General  government  balance  (os  I  of GOP)  -3,30  -1,30  -9,20 
Balance of payments 
Exports of G'S  (in bn  USO)  13, DO  12,15  10,90 
Current  account  balance  (in  I  of GOP)  2,60  1,17  2,50 
Net  inflow of foreign direct investment  (in mio  USD)  -90,00  (0,00  0,00 
Official  FX  reserves  (end of period) 
in  bn USD  1,60  1;so  l,'SO 
in months  of illlports  o~ G'S  2,00  2,00  1,90 
'  External debt 
Externa'l  debt  26,96  26,11  2(,58 
(in convertible cur.renc.ies,  in  bn  usn,  end  of period) 
medium  and  long-term  (>'I  year)  26,20  25,00  (a) 
short-term  (•<  1  year)  1,00  1,20  (a) 
Convertible debt  service  (in bn  USD)  - 9,20  9,10  9,10 
principal  6, 70  6,80  7,00 
interest  2,50  2,30  2,10 
External  debt/GOP  (I)  63,30  58,60  53,(0 
External debt/exports of G'S  (I)  209,(0  215,60  225,30 
Debt service/exports of G'S  (I)  70,50  75,00  83,60 
Arrears  (on  both  interest  and  priflCipal,  in mio  USD)  (b)  (b)  (b) 
Debt  relief agreements  and  rescheduling  (b)  (b)  ·(b) 
IMF  arrangements 
Type/no  - (d)  (b)  (b) 
(Date  I  - )  (6/91-3/92) 
On  ~rack/  ott track  (e) 
(  - I  Date)  (f) 
' 
Indicators  of market's  perceived creditworthiness 
.  ' 
Hoo4y's  long-term  foreign  currency  rating  (end  of per.)  (c)  (c)  (c) 
s,p long-term  foreign  currency  rating  (end  of period)  (c)  (c)  (e) 
EIU  country  risk service  (1) 
Score  (end  of  period)  (c)  (c)  (c) 
Rating  (end of period)  - (c)  (c)  (e) 
Euroeoney  Har  Sep 
Position  in the  ranking  (2)  83  66  68  79 
(nwnber  of countries)  (130)  (169)  (169)  (170) 
The  Institutional  Investor  Har  Sep  Har  Sep  Har  Sep 
Position  in the ranking  (2)  (7  52  53  57  62  69 
(nwnber  of countries)  (111)  (113)  (119)  (126)  (127)  (133) 
Credit rating  (3)  - 37.9  34.2  33.1  28.9  28.2  -·27.1 
(1)  Countries  are given  a  rating  between A - E and  a  score  between  1  - 100,  with  E and  100  representing  the~highest risk. 
(2)  The  higher  the score  in the  ranking,  the  lower  the creditworthiness of the country.  ., 
(3)  Countries  are rated  on  a  scale of zero to 100,  with  100  representing the least  chance  of default.  A given country 
may  ·improve  its rating  and still fall  in the  ranking. if also the  average  global  rating  for all rated countries  improves. 
(a)  n.a. 
(b)  No 
(C)  Note  rated 
(d)  SBA 
(e)  Off-track 
(f)  Ql  1992 - 48  -
II-F-3 
Last update 
Country  Risk indicator's 
24/10/94  Country:·  Bufqaria· 
.-
Real  GOP  qrowth  r.ate  [in  \}  -
Industrial .production  [  \  change) 
v.nempl oyment  rate  [end  of period! 
-
Inflation rate· 
Excha,nge  rate  [Leva  per VSD)  [end of period! 
•  depreciation)  Nominal  affective exchange rat  [change,  Q4/Q4)  [-
Real  effective exchanqe rate  [change,  Q4/Q4)  1- •,:depreciation) 
General  government  ba-lance  [as  '  of GOP) 
Balance of payments 
Exports  of G&S  lin bn  VSO) 
Current  account  balance  lin ' 
of  GDP) 
Nat  inflow of  forei9n direct  investment  [in mio  VSOJ 
Official  FX  reserves  tend  of period) 
in  bn  VSO 
in months  of  imports  of·G&S 
-
Extel-nal  debt 
~ 
External  debt  [2) 
(in convertible currencies,  in bn VSD,  end of 'periOd) 
medium  and  lonq-term  ~~  i  year) 
short-.  term  [-<  1  year) 
· Convertible debt  service  (in bn  VSD) 
principal 
interest 
External  debt/GOP  (\) 
External  debt/exports of G&S  (\} 
Debt  service/exports of  G&S  [\) 
Arrears  [on both  interest  and  principal,  in bn  VSDJ 
Debt  relief agreements  and  rescheduling 
' 
IMF  arrangements 
Type/no 
[Date  I  -.) 
on'track/off track 
(  - I  Date) 
Indicators of market's  perceived credi twor.thiness 
.. 
Moody's  long-ter~ 'toreiqn currency  ratinq  [end  of period] 
S&P  long-term  foreign  currency rating  (end  of period] 
EIV  country  ri.sk  service  (3] 
Score  (end  of period) 
Rating. (end  of period) 
Euromoney 
Position  in  the  ranking  (4' 
[number  of countries)  .. 
The  Institutional  Investor 
Position  in  the  ranking  (4} 
(number  of countries} 
Credit  rating  (5) 
For  some data,  preliminary  e.:s.t~mate~. 
Any  short-term debt  is  actually arrears. 
-
.. 
1992  1993  UJ 
-5,60  -4',20 
-11,00  -9,00 
15,30  ~6,30 
79,40  ·63,90 
24,50  33,32 
-15,74  [Q3/Q3)  -3,10 
43,62  59,17 
-7,40  -13,60 
4,00  '4,00 
-9,20  -7,90 
42,00  55,00 
I 
1,00  0,70 
2,20  1,50 
12,50  12,80 
/  [a)  (a) 
(a)  (a) 
2,00  1,·70 
1,40  1,10 
0,,60  0,60 
144,00  124,00 
248,00  249,00 
39,00  32,00 
6,05  tai 
(g)  [h) 
.. 
[d)  (b) 
[03/94-03/95)  -
'·  (e)  -
-
-
. (c)  ·(C) 
(c)  (c) 
80  80 
E  E 
Sep  Mar  Sep 
91  122  125. 
116!11  [169)  (170) 
Mar  Sep  Mar  ·sep 
81  86  91  89 
[119)  [126)  [127)  (133) 




'[3)  Countries ·are  given  a  rating  between  A  - E  and  a  score between  1  - 10.0,  with  E  and  100.  representing 
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Paris  Club 
London  Cl. 
[resched.);  London  Cl.  (roll-overs) 
(roll-overs,  and  DDSR  agreed  in principfe) - 19  -
II-F-3  Country  Risk  indicators 
Last  update 
21/10/91  Country:  Czech  Republic 
1992  1993 
Real  GOP  growth  rate  (in l)  -7,10  -0,30 
Industrial production  (  l  change)  -10,60  -5,10 
Unemployment  (l  of  labour  force)  (end o! period)  3,10  3,50 
Inflation rate  (Dec/Dec)  12,70  18,20 
Exchange  rate  (CK's  per .USD)  (end of period)  28,90  29,90 
Nominal  effective exchange  rate  (change,  QI/QI)  (- •  depreciation)  0,98  (Q3/Q3).  3,70 
Real  effective exchange rate  (change,  QI/QI)  (- •  depreciation)  9,13  (Q3/Q3)  15,90 
General  government  balance  (as  l  of GOP)  0,10  0,00 
\ 
Balance of payments 
Exports  of  G&S  (in mio  USD)  11800,00  16728,00 
Current  account  balance  (in  l  of GOP)  0,10  1, 80 
Net  inflow of foreign direct  investment  (in  mio  USDJ  983,00  517.00 
Official  FX  re.serves  (end  of period) 
in  bn  USD  0,73  3,80 
in months  of imports of G&S  1,10  2,70 
External  debt  (end  of period) 
External  debt  6,92  9, 00 
· (in convertible  currencie~,  in  bn  USD,  end  of periOd! 
medium  and  long-ter~  <.>  1 ·year)  5,12  6,80 
.short-term  (•<  1  year)  1,80  2,20 
cOnvertible  debt  service  (in  bri USD)  1,35  1,11 
principal  0, 83  0,90 
interest  0,52  0,51 
External debt/GOP  (')  25,36  28,57 
External debt/exports  of G&S  (l)  16,78  53,80 
Debt  service/exports  of G&S  (I}  9,12  8, 03 
Arrears  (on  both  interest  and  principal,  in mio  USD)  (b)  (b) 
Debt  relief agreements  and  rescheduling  (b)  (b) 
,.  .·. 
IMF  arrangement" . 
Type/no 
.'  (d)  (d) 
(Dote  I  - )  (1/92-4/93)  (3i93-3/94) 
On  track/off track  (e1)  (e2) 
(  - I  Dote) 
lndicator.s  of market's  perceived  creditworth~ness 
Moody's  long-term  foreign  currency  rating  (end  of period)  (1)  Bol  Baal 
S'P  long-term  foreign  currency  rating  (end  of period)  (c)  BBB-
EIU  country  risk service  (2)' 
Score  (end  of  period)  30  25 
Rating  (end of period)  B  B 
Euromoney  H·ar  - Sep 
Position  in  the  ranking  (3)  49  48  43 
(number  of countries)  (169)  (169)  (170) 
The  Institutional  Investor  (1)  Mo~ - Sep  Kar  - Sep 
Position  in  the  ranking  (3)  37  39  42  10 
(number  of countries)  (119)  (125)  (127)  (133) 
Credit  rating  (4)  47.1  46.1  44.6  46.6 
{1}  For  '1992,  rating  or  position  in  the  ranking  assigned to the  former  CSFR. 
(2! ·  Countries  ore  given  a  rating  between  A  - E  and  •  score between  1  - 100,  with  E  and  100  representing 
the  highest  risk. 
(3)  The  higher  the  score  in  the  ranking,  the  lower  the  creditworthiness  of the  country. 
(4)  co·untries  are rated on  •  scale of zero to 100,  with  100  representing the  least chance of default.  A given  country 
may  improve  its rating  and  still fa}},in the  ranking  if also the average  global  rating  for  all  rated countries  improves. 
(a)  n.a. 
(b)  No 
(c)  Note  rated 
. (d)  SBA 
(ell On-track  but  expired  with dissolution of  CSFR 
(e2)  On-track II-F-l.  Country Risk indicators 
Laat update 
24/10/94  Country: 
Real  GOP  growth rate  (in \) 
fndu.otrial  production  (  \  change! 
Unemployment  ~ate  (end  of period) 
Inflation rate 
Estonia 
.- 50  -
Exchange rate  (Krona  per USD) 
Nominal  effective eKchange  rat 
Real  effective eKchange rate 
(end of period) 
(change,  Q4/Q4) 
(change,  Q4/Q4) 
(- •  depreciation) 
(- .• depreciation) 
General  government  balance  (a"  \  of ._GOP) 
Financial balance  (2) 
Fiscal balance. (2) 
Ba~ance of payments 
EKport"  of goods  (in mio.USD) 
Current  account  balance  (in  \  of  GOP) 
Net  _inflow  of foreign direct  investment  (in mio  USD} 
Official  FX  reserves  (end' of period} 
in  mio  USO 
In months  of qoods  imports 
External  debt 
External  debt 
.(in convertible currenciee,  in bn  USO,  end  of_period) 
medium  and  long-term  (>  1  year) 
short-term  (-<  1  year) 
Convertible debt  service  (in mio  USD) 
principal 
interee:t 
External debt/GOP  (\) 
External debt/exports  of  G&NFS  1'1 
Debt  service/exPorts  ot  G6NFS  (\) 
Arrears  (on  both  iri.ter:est  and  principal,  in  mio  USD) 
Debt  relief agreements· and  reschedulinq 
IMF  arrangements 
Typ.e/no 
(Date  I  - ) 
On  track/off track 
(  - I  Date) 
IndicatorZII  0
1
f  market's perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's  lonq-term foreiqn  currency. rati'ng  (end of period}. 
S&P  long-term  foreign  currency rating  (end of period) 
EIU  country ri.,k'service  (3) 
Scoie  (end  of Period) 
Rating  (end of period) 
Euromoney 
Position  in  the  ranking  (4) 
(number.of  countries) 
-The  Institutional  Investor 
Position  in  the  ranking  (4) 
(number  of  countries) 
Credit  ratinq  '(5) 
(1)  For  some  data,  preliminary  estimate~. 
1992.  1993  (1) 
-19,00  -3,00 
-38,70  -27,00 
2,00  1,70 
953,50  35,70 
1,71  1,58 
(a)  (a) 
(a)  (a)  -
0,80  0,20 
0,50  -1,40 
457,20  802,10 
7,20  0,40 
57,90  144,20 
195,20  378,70 
4,50  4,80 
38,10  140,00 
(a)  (a) 
(a)  (a) 
20,80  19;80 
(a)  (a) 
(a)  (a) 
3,30  7,10 
5,90  1-2,70 
3,20  1,80 
(b)  {b) 
(b)  (b) 
-
(dl)  (d2) 
(9/92-9/93  (10/93-3/94) 
(e)  '(e) 
-eel  (c) 
(c)  (c) 
BO  75 
E  D 
Sep  Mar  Sep 
117  126  122 
(169)  (169)  (170) 
Mar  Sep  Mar  Sep 
68  74  81  84 
(119)  (126  (127)  (133) 
25.7  22.  21.4  20.9 
(2)  Financial  balance does  not  take  into account  government  net  lending,  wheCeas  fiscal  balance does. 
(3)  Countriee:  are  given
0a .:rating  between A  - E  and  a  ~cor~ between  1:- 100,  withE  8nd  100  representing 
- the hiqheet  ri15k.  · 
(4)  The  hiqher  the score in the  ranking,  the  lower the creditworthiness of the country. 
(5)·  Countries· are rated on  a  .. cale of zero  to  100,  with  100  represen-ting  the least chance of default.  A  given  country. 
may  improve  its rating  and· st.ill  fall  in  the  ranking  if ~lao the  average  ?loba~ rating  for. all  rated .countries  improves. 
-:--
(a) n.a. 
(bf  No 
(cf  Note  rated 
(d1)  SBA 
ld2) SBA/STF 
(e)  On-track - 51  -
II-F-3  Country Risk indicators 
Last update 
24/10/94  Country:  Hungary 
1991  1992  1993 
Real  GOP  growth rate  (in \)  -11,90  -4,40  -2,30 
Industrial production  (  \  change)  - -19,10  -9,80  4,00 
Unemployment  (\ of labour force)  (end of period)  a,oo  12,30  12,10 
Inflation rate  32,20  21,60  21,10 
Exchange  rate  (forints per  USD  (end of period)  76,78  83,97  100,70 
Nominal  effective exchange  rat  (change,  Q4/Q4)  (- •  depreciation)  -13,71  -5,40  -3,10 
Real  effective exchange  rate  (change,  Q4/Q4)  (- •  depreciation)  10,49  7,90  10,20 
General  government  balance  (as  \  of GOP)  (GFS  definition)  -4,32  -6,90  -7,00 
'  Balance  of payments 
Merchandise  exports  (in mio  USO)  9258,00  10028,00  8094,00 
Current  account  balance  (in  \  of GOP)  0,80  0,74  -10,00 
Net  inflow of foreign· direct  investment  (in mio  USD)  1474,00  1471,00  .2328, 00 
Official  FX  reservee  (end  of period) 
in  bn USO  4,00  4,40  7,70 
in months  of imports  of merchandises  5,30  6,10  8,20 
External  debt 
Ex tarnal  debt  22,66  21,50  24,56 
(in  convertible currencies,  in  bn  usn,  end  of period) 
medium  and 
0long-term  (>  1  year)  20,20  19,30  22,80 
.  :5hort-term  (•<  1  year)  2,18  2,29  1,80 
Convertible debt  service  (in .bn  USO)  4,00  4, 40  4,30 
p;,.incipal,  2,40  2,80  2,60 
interest  1, 60  1,60  1,80 
External  debt/GOP  (\)  72,19  60,55  68,03 
External debt/  mercha.ndise  expo.rts  (\)  244,76  214,40  303,43 
Debt  service/ merchandise  exports  (\)  43,21  43,88  53,13 
Arrears  (on  both  int~rest and  principal,  in mio  USD)  (b)  (b)  (b) 
Debt  relief agreements  and  resche~uling  (b)  (b)  (b) 
IMF  arrangement:s 
Type/no  (dl)  (d1)  (d2) 
(Date  I  - J  (2/91-2/941  (2/91-2/94)  ( 9/93-12/94 J 
On  track/off track  (e1 J  (e2)  (ell 
(  - I  Date)  (f)  -
Indicators of market's  perceived  ereditworthines~ 
Moody's  long-term  foreign  currency rating  (end  of period)  8a1  8a1 
S&P  long-term  foreign  currency rating  (end of period)  88+  88+ 
EIU  country risk .service 0(1)  ' 
Score  (end of period)  40  50 
Rating  (end of period)  8  c 
Euromoney  Mar  Sep 
Position in the ranking  (2) 
' 
44  46  47  46 
(number  of  c~untrie~)  (130)  (169)  (169)  (170) 
The  Institutional  Inve~tor  Mar  Sep  Mar  Sep  Mar  Sep 
Position in the ranking  (2)  41- 42  42  43  43  43 
(number,of countries)  (111)  (113)  (119)  (126)  (127)  (133) 
Credit rating  (3)  41.1  40.9 41.7  42.3  44.3  44.8 
(1)  Countries  are given  a  rating  between A- E  and  a  score between 1-.100, withE and  100  representing 
the  highest  risk. 
(2)  The  higher  the  ~core in  the  ranking,  the  lower  the  creditworthine~~ of the  country. 
(3)  Countrie~ are  rated  on  a  ~cale of zero  to  100,  with  ~00 representing  the  least chance of default.  A  given country 
may  improve  its rating  and  ~t~ll fall  in  ~he .ranking  if also the  average  global  rating  for all  rated  countries  improves. 
(a)  n.a. 
(bl  No 




· ( e2  I  Off-track 
(f)  ·Summer - !;2  -
II-F-3 
Last  update: 
25110191 
Country  Risk indicators 
Country:  hrael 
'  Rea 1'  GOP  growth  rate  (in I I 
Industrial production  (  I  changel  (at constant  1990  prices} 
Unemployment  rate  (averagel 
Number  of Immigrants  (in thousandsl 
Consume~ Price.Index  (Dec/Dec) 
Exchange rate  (sheqalim per USO) 
Nominal  effective exchange rate 
··· R.eal  effectiye  ·exchange rate 
(end  of period) 
[change,  QIIQI) 
[cl:tange,  QIIQI) 
Central  government  overall deficit  (as  I  of GOP) 
Balance of payments  , 
Exports  (in bn  USD) 
Current  account  baiance  (in  I  of GDPJ 
[- •.,deprec.) 
{- •  deprec·. ) 
Net  inflow of foreign direct  investment  (in mio  USD) 
Gross official  FX  reserves  (end  of periodl  (in months  of total  imports) 
. in billions US$ 
in months  of  imports of G'S 
Externa  1 debt 
External debt  (gross  external  liabi'lities) 
(in. bn  USD,  end of periodf 
medium  and  long-term'(>  1  year) 
short-term  (-<  1  year) 
Debt  service  (in bn  USDJ 
principal  . 
interest  (gro~s) 
External  debt/GOP  (I) 
External debt/exports  C'f. 
Debt  service/exports of goods  and  services  l') 
Arrears  (on  both  interest  and  principal,  in  mio  USO) 
Debt  relief agreements  and·rescheduling 
IMF  arrangemen~s 
Type/no 
(Date  I  - ) 
On  track/off track 
(  - I  Date) 
Indicators  of market's  perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's 'long-term. foreign· currency rating  (end of period) 
S'P  long-term  foreign  currency  rating  (end  of· Period) 
EIU  country  risk  se~vice (lf 
Score  (end  of period) · 
Rating  (end of period) 
Euromoney 
Position  in the  ranking  ·[2) 
...  (nuinber .of eount.f-ies) 
The  Institutional, Investor 
Position  in· the  ra~king  (2) 
(number  of countries) 


































Mar  Sep 
- 51  51 
[111)  (113) 
[31. 9)  (3!:>.'2) 
. 1992  1993 
6,60  3,50 
9,20  6,50 
11;20  10,00 
77,00  77,00 
,. 
f 
9,10  11,30 
2,76  ·2,99 
-9,'70  -6,10 
-1,90  1, eo 
"o 
~2,t0  -3,60 
' 
13,30  11,90 
0,10  -1,80 
-310,00  [a) 
5,13  6,39 
2,20  2,10 
33', 60  36,10 
"  23,20  [a I 
10,10  [a) 
6,50  6,10 
1,20  1,10 
2,30  2,30 
52,30  55,90 
155,00  135,00 
31,00  29,00 
[b)  (b) 
[b)  (b) 





(C)  [c) 
BBB- BBB+ 
[a)  (a) 
(a)  [a,> 
Mar  Sep 
32  29  29 
(1691  [169)  (170) 
Mar  Sep  Mar· Sep 
so  52  46  .46 
(119)' (126}  (127]  {133} 
-37.1  3!:>.1  39.6  to.s 
'' 
lll  Countries are given  a  rating between  A - E and  a  score between  1  - 100,  with  E  and  100  representing the highest  risk 
_[2)  The  higher the score  i~ the ranking,  the  lower the creditworthiness of the country. 
(3)  Countries  are  rated  on  a  scale of zero to 100, ·with  100  representing  the  least  chance of default.  A  given  country 
may  improve  its rating and still fall  in the  ranking if also the  overage global  rating for all rated countries  improves. 
(af  n  .. a. 
(b)  No 
(C)  Note  rated 
(d)  CcFF 





Country  Risk indicators 
Country: 
Real  GOP  growth  rate  (in [) 
Industrial  pr~uction (  & change) 
Unemployment  {end  of period) 
Inflation rate 
Exchange .rate  (Lata  per·uso) 
Nominal  effective exchange  rate 
Real  effective exchange  rate 
(end of period) 
(change,  QI/QI) 
(change,  QI/QI) 
General  government  balance  (as  '  of  GOP) 
Financial  balance  (2) 
Fiscal balance  {2) 
Balance  of payments 
Exports  (in·mio USD) 
CUrrent  account  balance  (in  '  of GOP) 
Latvia 
{- •  depreciation) 
{- .• depreciation) 
Net  inflow of foreign direct investment  (in mio  USD) 
Official  FX  reserves  (end  of period) 
in  mio  USD  ' 
in months  of  imports  of G'S 
External  debt 
External  debt 
(in  convertible currencies,  in  mio  USD,  end  of period) 
medium  and  long-term  (>  1  year) 
shOrt-term  (•<  1  year) 
Convertible debt service  {in  mio  USD) 
principal 
interest 
External  debt/GOP  (') 
External  debt/merchandise  exports  (I) 
Debt  service/merchandise exports  {I) 
Arrears  (on  both  interest  and  principal,  in mio  USD) 
Debt  relief agreements  and  rescheduling 
lMF  arrangements 
Type/no 
(Date  I  - l 
On  track/off track 
(  - I  Date) 
Indicators  of market's  perceived creditworthiness 
Moody's  long-term  foreign  currency  rating  (end  of period} 
S'P  long-term  foreign  currency  rating  (end  of period} 
EIU  country  risk service  (3) 
Score  (end  of period) 
Rating  (end  of period) 
Euromoney 
Position in the  ranking  (4) 
(number  of countrie.s) 
The  Institutional  Investor 
Position  in- the  ranking  (4) 
(number  of countries) 
Credit  rating  (5) 























































(d1)  (d2) 
( 9/92-9/93)  (12/93-3/95) 








Har  Sep 
72  77 
(119)  (126) 
















87  ' 
(133) 
20.0· 
(2)  Financial  balance does  not  take  into account  government  net  lending,  whereas  fiscal  balance does. 
(3}  Countries  are  given  a  rating  between  A  - E and  a ·.scot·e  between  1  - 100,  with  E and  100  representing 
the  highest  risk. 
(t)  The  higher  the  score  in the  ranking,  the  l~er the  ered~tworthiness of the  country. 
(5)  Countries  are rated  on  a  scale of zero to 1d0,  with  100  representing the least chance  of default.  A  given  country 
may  improve  its rating  and still fall  in the.ranking  if also the average global  rating  for all rated countries  improves. 
(a)  n.a. 
(b)  No 
(c)  Note  rated 
(dl)  SBA 
(d2)  SBA/STF 
(e)  On-track - 51  -· 
II-F-3  Country  Risk  indicators 
Last  update 
24/10/94  Country:  Lithuania 
1992  1993  [1) 
Real  GOP  growth  rate  [in \)  -37,70  -16,20 
Indu8trial  prod~ction [.  \  change)  -51,60  -47,00 
Unemployment  rate,  [end of  period)  1,30  ._1, 60 
Inflation rate  1161; 10  188,60 
Exchange  rate  •[Lita~ per  USD)  [end of period)  1,80  3,90 
Nominal  effective exchange  rate  (change,  04/04)  [- •  depreciation)  [a)  [a) 
Real  effective exchange  rate  (change,  04/04)  (- - depreciatiOn)  (a)  (a) 
Generai  government  balance  (as  \  of GOP)  .' 
Financial balance ·(2)  o, 60  0,90 
Fiscal  balance  (2)  0,70  -4,60 
Balance of payments 
Exports  of G&S  (in  mio  USD)  1145,00  1B77,oo 
Current  account  balance  (in  \  of GOP)  3,40  -6,20 
Net  inflow of foreign direct  investment  [in mio  USD)  10,00  23,00 
Of!icial  FX"  re_serves  (end  of  period)_ 
in  mio  USD  106,00  uo,oo 
in_  month&  of imports  of G•S 
.; 
2, 60  2,40 
External  debt 
External debt  98,80  345,30 
{in convertible currencies,  in  bn  USD,  end  of period) 
medium  and  long-term  (>_ .1  year)  (a)  [a) 
short-term  (•<  1  yelarJ  (a)  (a) 
Conver'tible debt  service  {in ·mio  USD)  2,00  15,00 
priricipal  (a)  (a) 
interest  (a)  [a) 
External  debt/GOP  (I)  ,.  S, 4 0  11,20 
External debt/exports of  G&S  (\)  7,80  16,30 
Debt  service/exports of G'S  (\) 
'-
0,20  0,70 
Arrears  (on  both  interest  and  pCincipal,  in  mio 'USD)  (b)  (b) 
Debt  relief agreements  and  rescheduling  (b)  (b) 
IMF  arrangements 
Type/no  \  (d1)  (d2) 
(Date  I  - )  [10/92-9/93)  [10/ 93-3/  94) 
On  track/off track  (e)  (e) 
(  - I  Date) 
Indicator:s  of market':s  percei.ved  creditworthiness 
' 
Moody's  long-term  foreign  currency  rating  (end  of  period)  (c)  (c) 
S'P long-term  foreign  currency  rating  (end  of period)  (c)  (c) 
EIU  country risk :serVice  (3) 
Score  (end  of. period) 
~  80  75 
-Rating  (end  of period)  E  D 
Euromoney  Sep  Mar  Sep 
P03ition  in the  rank-ing  Ul  118  134  130 
(number  of countries)  (169)  (169)  (170) 
The  Institutional  Investor  Mar  Sep  Mar  Sep 
Position  in the  ranking  (4)  73  80  91  93 
(number  of countries)  (119t  (126)  (127)  (133) 
Credit  rating  (5)  23.7  20.7  18.9  19.0 
(1)  For some  data,  preliminary estimates. 
(2)  Financial  balance does  not  take  into_ account  government  net  lending,  wherea~ fiscal  balance does. 
("3)  Countries are given  a  rating between  A  - E  and  a  sc'?re  between  1  - 100,  ~ith E  and  100  representing 
the highest risk. 
(4)  The  higher  the score  in the ranking,  the  lower  the-creditworthiness of the country. 
(5)  Countries  are rated  on  a"scale Ot  zero to 100,  with  100  representing the least chance of def4ult.  A giVen  country 
may  improve  its .rating and still fall  in  the  ranking  if also.the average qlobal  rating  for  a11  rated countries  improves~ 
{a)  n.a. 
(b)  No 
(c) Note  rated 
dl  SBA 
d2  SBA/STF 
(e) On-track - 55  -. 
Il-F-3  Country  RiBk  indicator" 
La8t  update 
24/10/94  Country:  Romania 
1991  1992  1993  (1) 
Real  GDP  growth rate  (in 'l  -12,90  -13,60  1,00 
Industrial·production  (·\change)  -19,60  -22,10  7,70 
Unemployment  rate  (end of period)  6,10  8,40  9,90 
Inflation rate  (Dec/Dec)  222,80  198,50  295,50 
Exchange rate  (  lei per USDl  (end of period)  185,00  460,00  1276,00 
Nominal  effective exchange rat  (change,  04/04)  (- •  depreciation)  •72,95  -74,63  -56,86 
Real  effective exchange rate  (change,  04/04)  (- •  depreciation)  -17,08  -24,03  39,70 
General  government bah  ~tee  (as  '  of GDP)  0,60  ·-4,80  -0,10 
Balance of payments 
Exports of G&S  (in mio  USD)  3538,00  4299,00  4882,00 
Current  account balance  (in  \  of GDP)  -4,48  -8,80  -5,50 
Net  inflow of foreign direct  investment  (in mio  USD)  37,00  73,00  48,00 
Official  FX  reserves  (end  of period) 
in  mio  USD  198,00  93,00  52,00 
in month"  of imports of G&S  0,49  0,20  0,10 
External  debt 
External  debt  2,10  3,50  4,70 
(in convertible currencies,  in.bn USO,  end  of period) 
medium  and  long-term  (>  1  year)  1,10  2,40  3,30 
short-term  (•<  1  year)  1,00  1,10  1,40 
Convertible debt  service  (in mio  USD)  176,00  312,00 
principal  85,00  147,00 
interest  91,00  165,00 
External  debt/GDP  (\)  7,60  18,10  21,40 
External  debt/exports  of G&S  (\)  59,36  95,10  129,60 
Debt  Berviee/export"  of.G&S  (\)  0,60  4,10  6,40 
Arrear.s  (on both intereBt  and principal,  in mio  USD)  (b)  (b)  (b) 
Debt ·relief agreement"  and  rescheduling  ..  (b)  (b)  (b) 
IMF  arrangement.e 
Type/no  (d)  (b) 
(Date  I  - )  (5/92-3/93)  -
on track/off track  (e)  -
I  - I  Date)  Dec  92  -
Indicators of market's  perceived ereditworthfness 
Moody'"  long-term  foreign currency rating  (end  <?f  period)  (c~  (e)  (c) 
S&P  long-term  foreign  currency rating  (end  of period)  (c)  (e)  (c) 
EIU  country risk service  (2) 
Score  (end of period)  60  65 
Rating· (end of period)  D  D 
Euromoney  Mar  Sep 
Position in the  ranking  (3)  89  72  66  75 
(number  of countries)  (130)  (169)  (169)  (170) 
The  Institutional  Investor  Mar  Sep  Mar  Sep  Mar  Sep 
POsition  in  the  ranking  (3)  60  64  69  68  ·73  75 
(number  of  eountrie~)  (111)  (113)  (119)  (126)  (127)  (133) 
Credit  rating  (4)  27.9  26.7 25.6  24.8  24.2  24.4 
(1)  For  ~ome data,  preliminary  e~timates. 
(2)  Countries  are  given  a  rating  be~ween A  - £  and  a  score between  1  - 100,  with  E  and  100  representing 
the highe"t  risk. 
(3)  The  higher  the score in  the  ranking,  the  lower  the creditworthine"" of the country. 
\4)  Countries  are rated  on  a  scale of zero to 100,  with  100  repre.,enting  the lea"t chance  of default.  A given  country 
may  improve its rating  and still fall  in the  ranking  if also the  average global  rating  for all rated countrieB  improves. 
Ia)  n.a. 
(b)  No 
(c)  Note  rated 
(d)  S8A 
(e)  Off-track -·56 -
II-F-3  Country  R~"k indica ton  -
Last update:  .. 
25/10/94  .Country:  Russia 
-- - 1991  1992  1993 
Real  GOP  growth rate  lin \)  -12,90  -19,00  -12,00 
Indu.,trial production  I  \  change)  -8,20  -18,40  .-'16,40 
Unemployme~t·r~te  (end  of period  - ILO  definition)  (a)  (a)  5,10 
Inf:J.ation rate  (Dec/Dec)  160,00  2300,00  840,00 
Exchange  ra.te  [  Rbs  per USO)  [end. of period)  ' 
169,20  414,50  1247,00 
.Nominal  effective exchange rate  [change,  04/04)  [- •  depreciation)'  -63,60  (04/01)  -55.60  -62·,50 
Real  eff~gtive exchange  rate_  (change,  04/041  1- •  depreciation)  -25,30  (04/0ll  90,00  268,42 
General  government  balance  (a"  \  of  GOP)  -16,00  -18,80  -8,00 
Ba~ance of payments 
EXports  of  G&S  (in bn  I!SD)  (a)  57,00  69,00 
Cui  rent  account  balance  ( i,;- ' 
of GOP)  (a)  -1,20  1,80 
Net  inflow of  foreign direct  inv&stment  (in bn  USO)  -o.1.o  0,70  0,40 
official  FX  reserves  (end of period)  (excluding  gold) 
in  mio  USD  0,00  2,00  3,30 
in months  of imports of  G&S  o;oo  0,50  0,90 
ExteZ.nal  debt 
External  debt  67,00  78,70  83,70 
(in convertible cUrrencies,  in bn  us~,  end  of period) 
medium  and  long-term  (>  1  year)  54;30  65,70  !'0,60 
short-term  (a<  l  year)  12,70  13,00  13,10 
· Conv.ertible debt  service  (in  bn  USO) ·  (a)  15,60  19,60 
principal  (a)  10,40  14,70 
intere.st 
'· 
(a)  5,20  4,90 
External  debt/GOP  (%)  (a)  24,00  26,00 
External  debt/  expor't.s  of  G_&S.  ( \1  ·131,40  t:i7,00  122,00 
Debt  service/exports  of  G&S  (%]  (a)  25,00  29,00 
Arrears  (on  both  interest  and  principal,- in  bn  us of  4,80  11,80  11,00 
Debt  relief. agr_eements .and  rescheduling  (b)  (g)  (h) 
IMF  arrangements 
Type/no  c  (b)  ht credit  (d) 
(Date  I  -.)  tranche  Jul  93 
On  track/off  track  '  Aug ·92 
(  - I  Dat8) 
'  Indicators  of market's  perceived  creditworthiness 
Moody's  long-term  foreign  cu.i-rency  rating  (end of pedod)  .  (C)  (c)  (c) 
S&P  long-term  foreign  currency  rating  (end  of period]  (c)  (c)  (C) 
E.IU  country  risk .service  ( 1) 
Score  (end of period)  (a)  95  • 95 
Rating  (end  of period}  (a)  -E  E 
Eur.omoney.  Mar  Sep 
Position  in  the  ranking  12)  (a)  129  149  137 
'{number  of  ~ouOtries)  '·  (130)  (169)  (169)  1170)  l~ 
The  In:stitutional  Investor  Mar  Sep  Mar·  Sep  Mar  Sep 
Position  in  the  ranking  (2)  -- , [a)  -- 73  87  92 
(number  of countries]  ...  -- (113]  -- [126)  (127)  (133 J 
Credit  rating  (3)  -- 26.7  -- 23.6  20.2  19.0 
' 
(1)  Countries  are given  a_  rating  between A- E  and  a  score between  1  - too·,  with  E  and  100  repre.,enting  the highest risk. 
(2)  The  higher  _the  score  in the  ranking,  the  lower  the  creditworthine:s" of  ~he country. 
(3J  Countries  are  rated  on  a  scale of zero  to  100,  with  100  representing  the  least  chance of default.  A  given  country 
may  improve_its  rating  and  still  fall·  in  the  ranking· if also the-average  global  rati~g for  all  rated countries  improves. 
(a)  n.a .. 
(b)  No 
(c)  Note  rated 
(d)  STF 
(g)  Paris  Club  (deferral.,);  London  Club  (roll-overs) 
(h)  Paris  Club  (resctled.};  London  Club  (roll-overs,  and  resched.  agr.  i-n  prin~iple), - 57  -
II-F-3  Country  Risk indicators 
Last update 
21/10/91  Country:  Slovak Republic 
1992  1993 
Real  GOP  growth rate  {in  \)  .  -7,00  -1,10 
Industrial prOduction  {  \  change)  -12,80  -8,60 
Unemployment  {l  of labour force)  {end of period)  10,10  11,10 
Inflation rate  {Dec/Dec)  9,10  25,10 
Exchange rate  {SK's  per USO)  {end of period)  28,90  33,20 
Nominal  effective exchange  rate . (change,  QI/Qil  {- •  depreciation)  0,98  -1,90 
Real  effective exchange  rate  {change,  Qt/QI)  {- •  depreciation)  6,80  16,!0 
General  government  balance  {as  \  of GOP)  -13,10  -7,50 
Balance  of payments 
Exports  of G'S  {in mio USD)  8219,00  7568,00 
Current  account  balance  {in  \  of GOP)  1;  70  -3,90 
Net  inflow of foreign direct  investment  {in mio  USO)  100,00  131,00 
Official  FX  reserves  {end  of. period) 
in  mio  USD  356,00  395,00 
in months  of  imports  of G'S  0,70  0,90 
External  debt 
External debt  2,56  3,37 
(in  convertible  curren~i'e:s,  in.' bn  USO,  end  of period) 
medium  and  long-term  (>·l year)  2,11  -
short-term  (-<  1  yearl.  0,42  -
.Convertible debt service  (in mio USO)  675,00  671,00 
principal  115,00  190,00 
interest  260,00  184.00 
External  debt/GOP  l'l  25,61  3o;5o 
External debt/export"  of G'S  (I)  31,16  11,53 
Debt  service/exports of G'S  (I)  8,21  8, 91 
Arrear"  (on  both  interest and  principal,  in mio  USO)  (b)  {b) 
Debt  r~lief agreements  and  rescheduling  (b)  (b) 
IMF  arrangements 
Type/no  (d1)  (d2) 
(Date  I  - )  (1/92-1/93)  {7/93  - ) 
On  track/  off track  (ell  (e2) 
(  - I  Date) 
Indicators of market's  perceived  creditworthiness 
Moody's  long-term foreign  currency  rating  (end  of period)  (1)  Sal  (c) 
S'P  long-term  foreign  currency  rating  (end  of period)  (C)  ali-
EIU  country  risk service  (2) 
Score  (end  of  period)  (c)  (c) 
Rating  (end of period)  (C)  (c) 
Euromoney  Har  - Sep 
Position  in  the  ranking  (3)  58  56  63 
{number  of countries)  (169)  (169)  (170) 
The  Institutionai  Inve~tor  (1)  Har  - Sep  Mar  - Sep 
Position  in  the  ranking  (3)  37  39  57  57 
(nwnber  of countries)  ' 
(119)  (125)  (127)  (133) 
Credit rating  (4)  17.1  46.1  31  30.6 
(1)  F_or  1992,  ratihg  or  position  in the  ranking  assigned  to the  former  CSFR. 
(2)  Countries  are  given  a  rating  between  A  - E  and  a  score  between  1  - 100,  with  E and  100  rep~esenting 
the  highest  risk.  _ 
(3)  The  higher .the  score  in  the  ranking,  the  lower  the creditworthiness of the  country. 
(4)  Countries  are  rated  on  a  scale of zero to  100,  with  100  representing the  least  chance  of default.  A  given  country 
may  improve  its rating  and  still fall' in  the  ranking  if also the  average  global  rating  for  all  rated  countries  improves. 
(a)  n.a. 
(b)  No 
(c)  Note.  rated 
(d1)  SBA 
(d2)  STF 
(el) On-track but  expired with dissolution of CSFR 
(e2) On-track -58~ 
TABLE l 
·cAPITAL OUTSTANDING· IN RESPECT OF OPERATIONS AUlHORISED 
Operation  . AUthorized ceiling  Capital  capital  .Remainder to be 
outstanding  outstanding  disbuned 
31.12.1993  30.6.1994  30.6.1994  . 
MEMBER STATES .  i~ 
A. Balance of  payments  14o0o 
1. Greece I  1 750  200  0 
2. Greece 11  \  2 200  1000  1000  1200 
3. Italy  8000  3990  4005  4000 
B. Other 
4.Euratom  . 
.4000  1018  862  0 
5. NCiand 
NCI Cartbqualccs  6830  2202  11880  0 
6. EIB Mediterranean. 
Spain, Greece, Port.  1 500  572  527  0 
MEMBER STATES-TOTAL  26 330  '  8892  li 274  5 200 
THIRD COUNTRIES  580 
A. Financial assistance  ~  6 317 
1. Hungary  1050  790  790  260 
2. Czech Republic  250  250  250  0 
3. Slovak Republic  125  125  12s  0 
4. Bulgaria  400  290  290  llO 
5. Romania  580  455  455  125 
6.Aigeria  400  250  250  150 
7. Israel  160  160  160  0 
8. Baltic States  220  110  llO.  110 
9. Moldova  ..  45  45 
10. Fonner Soviet Union  1250  803  934  I  316 
B. Other 
l L EIB Mediterranean  6 282  1596  1634.  3 921 
1_2.  EIB Central & EasU:m Europe I  1700  300  390  1310. 
13. EIB Central & EasU:m Europe 11  3000  2  2 998 
14. EIB Asia, Latin America  . 750  750 
15. Guarantee, CIS  500  266  133  0 
THIRD COUNTRIES -TOTAL  ."16 712  '5  395  5 524  '  10 094 
GRAND TOTAL  43042  14377  13 798  15 294 
No disbursement IS planned.  .. 
. 2 ·  ···The third and fourth tranches had stiU not been paid at 30 June 1994.  So far, the I  tiLl ian .Government has not requested paymenl 
ANNEX TOT  ABLE 1 
SITUATION IN RESPECT OF Effi OPERATIONS AT 30 JUNE 1994 
"' 
Operations  Credit line  Loans made  Initial  Amount 
. ·authorized·  •· available, minus  ·  ·.  disbursement  .  outstandirlg at  ,. 
cancellations  30.6.1994 
EIB Mediterranean 
Spain, CJreecl;, Portugal  1 5o"o  1465  1.614  527 
Third countries EIB Med.  6282  3 792  2361  1634 
Central & Eastern Europe I  1700  1650  390  390 
Central & Eastern Europe_ II  3 000  10  2  2 
Asia, Latin America  750  139  0  0  ..  ..  . . 
NB:  The fact that the trutial dtsbursement sometimes exceeds the authonzed cellmg 1s due to differences 




TABLE2  · 
MAXIMUM ANNUAL RISK BORNE BY TIIE COMMUNITY BUDGET 
(Estimate in ECU million based on all operations 
disbursed at 30 June 1994)  · 
..  ...  1994  1995  1996  ·1997  1998  1999  ,.  2000 
MEMBER STATES 
CAPITAL 
A  Balance of  payments 
1. Greece  200'  500  500 
2.ltaly  soo  996  2509 
B. Structural loans 
3. Euratom  270  47  153  ·463  92  16·  13 
4. NCI and NCI EQ  656  487  317  534  92  41  41 
5. EIB Med. Old. Prot 
Sp. Gr. Port.  91  84  78  77  58  51  46 
Capital-subtotal  1217  618  1 548  1074  1738  108  2608 
INTEREST  - . 
A  Balance of  payments 
1. Greece  110  95  95  46  46 
2. Italy  253  253  253  214  114  158  ., 158 
B. Structural loans 
3. Euratom  81  63  58  43  10  3  1 
4. NCI and NCI EQ  188  131  91  65  17  8  s 
S.  EIB Mecl. Old. Prot 
Sp. Gr. Port.  so  42  35  27  21  15  11 
IntereSt· subtotal  683  584  532  395  307  184  175 
MEMBER STATES-TOTAL  1900  1202  2080  1469  2045  292  2784 
.·NON-MEMBER COUNJ1UES 
CAPITAL 
A  Financial assistance 
6. Hungary  350  260  80  100 
7. Czech Republic  127  123 
8. Slovak Republic  63  62 
9. Bulgaria  140  ISO 
10. Romania  18.5  190'  80 
11. Israel  160 
12.Aigeria  250 
13.ExUSSR  147  553  202  '  32 
14. Baltic States  110 
B. Guarantees 
15. EIBMed.  130  140  139  144  149  146  135 
16. EIB C+E Eur. I+ II  2  13  24  30  36  37  36 
17. Aid, Russia SOOm  133  133 
Capital ·subtotal  412  I 188  625  I 026  805  373  361 
INTEREST 
A  Financial assistance 
6. Hungary  79  79  . 44  . 18  10 
7. Czech Republic  25  25  25  25  13 
8. Slovak Republic  .. 
13  .\3  13  I3  .6 
9. Bulgaria  29  29  29  29  15 
IO. Romania  .  46  46  46  46  46  27  8 
11. Israel  16  I6  16  16 
12.Aigeria  25  25  25  ~5 
13. Ex USSR  60  72  .13  2 
I4. Baltic States  11  11  11  }I  11  11  11' 
B. Guarantees 
IS. EIBMed.  120  ll4  I03  93  82  71  61 
16. EIB C+E Eur. I+ II  21  27  26  24  22  19  17 
17. Aid, Russia 500m  24  9 
Interest - subtotal  468  466  351  302  205  129  97 
NON-MEMBER  880  1 654,  976  1327  1 010  502  457 
COUNTRIES-TOTAL 
GRAND TOTAL  2780  2 856  3 056  2 797  3 055  794  3 24I 
(Eastern Europe)  590  1359  693  640  778  284  261 
(Other non-member countries)  290  295  283  688  232  218  196 
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TABLE3  . 
MAXIMUM THEORETICAL ANNUAL RISK BORNE BY THE COMMUNITY BUDGET 
_ &stimate in ECU million based on all operations  · 
disbursed adopted and proposed by the COmmission) 
-. 
1994  1995  '  1996  1997  1998  1999'  2000  2001  TOI'AL 
MEMBER STATES 
CAPITAL 
A Balance of  payments 
SOo  1. Greece  200  500  1200 
2.Itily  500  l 000  4498  2000  7998 
B. Structural Joans  ·-
3. Euratom + NCl  926 
"  S34  470  997  184  51  54  l  . 3223 
4. EIB Sp; Gr. Port  91  84  78  77  58  51  46  21  505 
Capital - subtotal  1217  618  1548  1074  1742  108  4598  2022  12926· 
INTEREST 
A  Bal&nce ofpaymenls 
9s  9S  46  46  · 1. Greece  110  392 
2. Italy  425  S9S.  . 680  638  638  553  .SS3  170  4,251 
B. Stnac:turalloans 
3. Euratom + NCI  .270  194  149  ·108  27  11  6  .2  761 
4. EIB Sp. Gr. Port.  so  42  35  27  2I  I5  11  7  209 
Interest • subtotal  8SS  926  9S9  8I9  732  579  S70  179  5619 
MEMBER STATES.  TOI'AL  2072  l 544  2506  1893  2474  687  s  168  2201  18S4S 
NON·  MEMBER courrnuES 
CAPIT~  ...  --
A  Financial assistance  .. 
•. 
S. Hungary  350  260  80  'IOO  ..  >260  1050 
_  6. Czech Republic  127  123 
.,  . .  .. 
. 25o 
7. Slovak Republic ·  ...  63  62  l2S 
8. Bulgaria·  140  ISO  ss  34S 
9, Romania  18S.  190  80  65  S20 
to, Israel  - 160  160 
11.Aigeria  .'  250  .. 
ISO  400 
12. Ex USSR  - 147  687  227  189  _.  1250 
13. Baltic'states  - llO  110  220 
I4. Moldova 
IS. Euratom, C+EEur.  10  23  37  70 
B. Guarantees 
16. EIBMed.  130  140  139  I9l  263  348  - 400  428  2039 
17. EIB C+E Eur.l +II  2  13.  24  7l  .  '  139  230  303  358  114I 
18. EIB, Asia. Latin America  c  5  14  28  44  56  147 
19. Ail(  Russia, a-.  SOOm  133  133  266 
Capital - subtotal  r  412  I323  650  I276  I 036  807  959  I 520  7983 
INTEREST 
A  Financial assistanCe 
5. Hungaiy  79  79  44  44  36  26  26  26  360 
6. Czech Republic  2S  25  ·2s  25  I2 
7. Slovak Republic  13  13  13  13  6  ·ss 
8. Bulgaria  -29  34  40  40  26  11  11  11  202 
· 9. Romania  45  51  58  S8  58  40  21  12  . 343 
10. Israel  16  16  16  16  64 
11. Algeria  25  40  40  40  IS  - 15  15  IS  205 
12. Ex USSR·  ..  80  110  42  •19  25.1 
i3. Baltic Staies  11.  22  22  22  22  22  22  11  1S4 
14. Moldova  2  4  4  4- 4  4  4  26 
15. Euratom, C+E Eur.  8  25  ·'  4S  .  65  8S  102  li)7  103  540 
B. Guarantees  ' 
; 
16. EIBMed.  I48  210  293  368  409.  41S  33S  213  239I 
17. EIB C+E Eur.l +II  .  '  .  46  114  203  295  361  -392  382  347  2 140 
18, EIB, Alia, Latin America  3  11'  . 25  43.  58  67  66  60  333 
19. Ail(  Russia, Guir  .. SOOm  24  9  33 
Interest • subtotal  .  552  76I  870  1052  1092  1094  989  802  7100 
NON-MEMBER  964  2 084  1 520  2328  2128  1901  1948  2322  1:5083 
COUNTRIES-TOTAL 
GRAND TOTAL  3 03S  3628  4026  4 221  4602  2 588  7116  4523  33628 
(Eastern Europe)  642  1667  1 007  1255  1.369  1027  1089  1.399  9344 
(Other non-member oounlries)  322  417  513  1072  759  874  . 859  923  5 738 - 61  -
EXPLANATORY NOTES-
The purpose of these tables is to show the annuaL repayinents of capital and interest in . 
respect  of borrowing  and  lending  operations  for  which  the  risk  is  covered  by- the 
Community budget.  The figures show the maximum possible risk for the Community in 
respect of these  operations and must not be  read  as  meaning  that these  amounts  will 
actually be drawn from the budget.· In the case of Table 3,  it is not certain that all  the 
operations described will actually be disbursed.  No account has been taken of  interest on 
late payment or any additional costs such as lawyers• fees. 
I.  TYPES  OF  OPERATION  AND  PAYMENT  OF  THE  BUDGET 
GUARANTEE 
A~  Types of operation 
The· risk covered by the Community budget results from two types of  operation: 
- borrowing/lending operations; -
- guarantees given to third parties. 
In the first type of  operation, the Community borrows on the financial market and 
on-lends the proceeds (at the same rate and for the same term) to Member States 
(balance of payments), non-member countries (medium-term financial  assistance) 
or firms (NCI, Euratom).  · 
I 
The loan repayments are  scheduled to  match the repayments of the borrowings 
due from the CommuQity. _ If the recipient of the loan defaults; the Commission 
must draw on its budgetary resources to repay the borrowing on the due date. 
The loan guarantee is in respect of  loans granted by a financial institution (Em or 
commercial banks in the case of  the former Soviet Union).·  When the recipient of  a 
-guaranteed  loan  fails  to  make  a  payment  on  the. due  date,  the  Em  asks  the _ 
Commission to pay  the  amounts  owed  by  the_ defaulter in  accordance with  the 
contract of guarantee.  The guarantee must be paid within  three months of the 
Em's request.  The Em administers the loan with all the care required by bariking-
practice and is obliged to demand the-payments due after the guarantee has been 
activated. 
B.  Mobilization of  funds 
_The funds needed to pay the budget_guarantee can be raised in three ways: 
The~·-re-use of amounts  repaid ,by,.debtors··who--have,...<Jefaulted,  leading  to 
activation of the Community guarantee, allows payments to be made within a 
short period oftime always providing, of  course, that there are funds available. :-62 -· 
. - The transfer ·procedure can be used  ~o provide the budget heading  with the 
appropriations needed to cover the d~fault.  This method is used when there are 
..-.insufficient appropriations for re-use and must be. authorized in advance by the 
budgetary authority .. 
The  amount .required  may  be  taken  provisionally  from  cash  resources  in 
-~ccordance with .Article ·12ofthe Financial Regulation.  This method is used, in 
particular, when the Community has so short a deadline for the paym~nt of a 
· _  guw:antee that the budgetary authority has no time to approve a transfer. 
This  operation  is  subsequently·  regularized  by  ·means  of  a  transfer  or.  a 
. supplementary and/or amending budget. 
ll.  CALCULATION 
Some ofthe amounts indicated are the result of  estimates made on the basis ofthe· 
· following assumptions. 
Generally speaking, the .exchange rates for loans in currencies other than the ecu 
are assumed to have been stable since  30 June 1994.  However, borrowing and 
lending operations should not involve exchange risks for the Community.  Unless 
otherwise stated,  the  average rate of interest js estimated at 10%.  This  rate· is 
· . probably a little high for Effi loans, which.often attr~ct interest subsidies under the 
protocols.  · 
A.  Member States 
1.  Greece:  A  ·balance-of-payments  loan  of  ECU 2 200 million'  has  been· 
authorized.  ECU 1 000 million of  this amount will be disbursed in two tranches 
ofECU 500 million to be repaid in  1996 and ·1998  respectively  ..  It is assumed 
. that the. remaining ECU 1 200 million will not be disbursed. 
2  ..  Italy:  The Council  decision-of 18 January 1993 ·granted a ECU 8 000 miliion 
balance-of-payments loan to Italy.·  The  loan  is  to .be  made available  jn  four 
instalments. amounting to ECU 2 000 million each and - with the exception of 
the first instalment - is conditional oil the attainment of  agreed targets on Italy's  - . 
public debt and deficit. 
. The  first  two  instalments  were  released  in  1993.  - Concerning  the  coming 
period, the Council Decision states that the third instalment could be released as 
of 1 February 1994 (but the Italian Government has not yet applied for it).  The 
fourth instalmenfmay be released not earlier than 1 February 1995. 
·. -.If·the..Jtalian Government decides-to apply for the-release.ofthe third and fourth 
instalm~nts and the conditions are deemed to  be fulfilled ECU 2 000 ·million in · 
1994 and ECU 2 000 million in 1995 will be disbursed to the Italian Republic. ' 
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3.  Em. Mediterranean.  old  protocols:  Spain.  Greece.  Portugal:  These  are 
Community guarantees for Em operations in these countries prior to accession. 
The amounts are now final;· since all the loans authorized .have been disbursed. 
B.  Non-member countries 
a.  Financial assistance 
1.  Hungary 1:  The amounts of the first  two tranches are final  and  certain.  -
The third tranche of  the macrofiilancial·assistance decided in 1990 could be 
disbursed in 1995.  .  · 
2.  Hungary II:_  ECU 180 million has been granted and paid out in full. 
3.  Czech and  Slovak Republics:  ECU 375 million  has  been granted in,  two 
tranches for a maximum term of  seven years (bullet), with a first tranche of 
ECU 185 million and a second tranche ofECU 190 million for a term of  six 
years. 
4.  Bulgaria  1:  : ECU 290 million  has  been  granted  in  two  tranches  for· a 
maxinmrri ··term  of  seven  years  (bullet),  with  a  first  tranche  of 
ECU 150 nlillion  for  a  term  of seven  years  and  a  second  tranche  of 
ECU 140 million for a term offive years.  ·· 
5.  Bulgaria 11:. The financial  assistance of ECU 110 million  decided in  1992 
has  not been  disbursed  since  ,Bulgaria  h.as  failed  to  meet  the  necessary 
conditions. .  It is  assumed  .that  it  will  be  paid  in  twp  tranches  of 
ECU 55 million in 1994 and.1995. 
6.  Romania 1:  An estimated ECU 375 million in two tranches for a  maximum 
term of seven years (bullet).  The  first  tranche of ECU 190 million  was 
disbursed in  1992 with a term of  seven years and the secohd was disbursed 
in  1992 with a term of  six years.  · 
7.  Romania II:  The new operation involving ECU 80 million for a maximum 
term of  seven years was disbursed in 1993  .. 
8.  Romania III:  This is a seven-year loan ofECU-125 million to be disbursed .. 
in  two tranches.  No tranche has been disbursed  at 30 June 1994.  It is 
assumed that the first tranche of  ECU 65 million will be disbursed in  1994 
and the second tranche ofECU 60 million in 1995. 
9.  Moldova:  This is a ten-year loan ofECU 45 million to be disbursed in two 
tranches.  No tranche had been disbursed at 30 June 1994.  It is assumed 
-.that.the  ... first tranche ofECU25 rnillion.wilLbe..disbursed in  1994 and  the 




10.  Baltic States:  The first  tranche of a· loan of ECU 220 million· was paid in 
1993.  The second should be paid in 1994.  The two tranches will be repaid 
in 2000 and 2001 respectively. 
11.  Algeria:  ECU 400 million···· has  been  .. granted  in  two  tranches- or' 
ECU 250 million  and · ECU 150 miilion.  The  first  was  paid  m 
·.  December 1991. for a  teim of  six years: 
The second tranche should be paid in the second half of 1994 since Algeria 
now meets "the necessary conditions.  This tranche may soon be disbursed 
as  a  result  of Algeria's  new_  economic , programme, -which  has  been 
approved by the IMF. 
12.  Israel:- A loan ofECU 160 million has been paid in:tUll and is repayable in 
1997. 
·  ·  ~ '·b._,. Guarantees 
1.  EIB 
,· 
The EIB has supplied the figures  used for calculation of  the assumptions · 
made for drawing up Table 3 (EIB loans ~o non-member countries from its 
own resources). 
- Loans  not disbursed .  (Loans  not  signed  and  loans  signed  but not yet· 
disbursed) 
The following table shows the situation as regards ·loans· which have not 
been disbursed. 
Year  1994  1995  1996  TOTAL 
Mediterranean countries
7  2 261
8  830  830  3 921 
Central and Eastern Europe 11
9762.6  965.  1270  ·2 997.6 
· Other non-memb~r  countries  250  250  250  '  750' 
In the case of loans not disbursed,. we :have assumed that an average of 
10% of the loan will  be disbursed in  the year· of signature and 30% in 
each of  the three following years ..  ·  · 
· In the absence of a financial statement, all loans still to be committed under the financial protocols 
for  the Mediterranean  countries  expiring  at  the end  of 1996  have  been  spread  evenly  over the 
period  '1994~96. 
This amount breaks down into ECU 1 431  million in loans to be disbursed under contracts signed 
before 30 June 1994 and ECU 830 million in loans to be signed and disbursed in 1994 .. · 
Countries  of Central  and  Eastern  Europe:  decision  of 13 December 1993  concerning  a  loan  of 
ECU 3-000 million.  .  .. -65-
It is estimated that the average term will be fifteen years wi* a three-year 
period of  grace._ 
2.  Food aid for the former Soviet Uniqn 
(a)  Guarantee 
This is a _guarantee for a bank loan of ECU 500 million,  with principal 
and interest fully covered by the budget, for a term of  three and a half 
years with three repayments at intervals of eleven months starting from 
the twentieth month.  ECU 375 million has been used., 
(b)  Borrowing/lending 
An operation involving ECU 1 250 million for a maximum term of  three 
years. 
This borrowing will  be divided  between the various Republics of the 
former  Soviet Union.  Loans amounting to less than ECU 100 million 
will be repaid in one instalment three years after the-start of  the period in 
which the funds may be drawn.  Borrowings exceeding ECU 100 million 
will be repaid in two instalments two years and three years after the start 
of  the period in which the funds may be drawn. 
Depending  on the type of  cpntract, there are two periods in which funds 
may be drawri;  one starts on 20 August, the other on 15 January. 
'  ' 
The-balance still to be used at 30 June 1994 came to ECU 316 million. 
3.  Euratom, countries of  Central and Eastern Europe 
Of  the ECU 1 100 million involved, it is assumed that ECU 150 million will 
be disbursed in  1994, ECU 200 million in  each of the four following-years 
and ECU 150 million in 1999.  , 
It is assumed that the loans will be for an a,verage term of  twenty years with 
a five-year period of  grace. 10 
II 
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DEFINITION OF FIGURES USED IN THE REPORT 
A.  Authorized ceiling 
This is the aggregate of  the maximum amounts of  capital·authorized (ceilings) for 
each operation decided by the Council (see Table 1}. 
In order to relate it to the risk which the budget might have to cover,  account 
should be taken of  the following factors which could affect it: 
- factor  increasing  the  risk:  the  interest  on the loans  must  be added  to the 
authorized ceiling; ~. 
- factors reducing the risk; 
- limitation of the guarantee given t.o  the Em to· 75% of  the loans· signed in 
the Mediterranean countries; 
- operations already repaid, since the amounts concerned, except in the case 9f 
balance of  payments support, are the maximum amount of  loans granted and 
not outstanding amoi.mts authorized; 
- the amounts authorized are not necessarily taken up in ful~. 
·,, 
The breakdown of  authorizations is as follows: 
Member States 
· Balance of  payments 
NCI  . 
Euratom 
·.  Em; Spain, Greece, Port~gal 




4 000  ll~_: 
1500 
26 330 
Authorized amount outstSnding:  once this  figur~ is reached,  further loans may  be granted ·as ..  .  .  . 
previous operations are repaid. 
Including_ ECU 1 100 million which may be granted to the countries of  Eastern Europe and the 













former Soviet Union I 
former Soviet Union II 
Baltic States 
·Moldova 
Em, old protocols 
Em, Eastern and Central Europe I 
·Em, Eastern and Central Europe II 
Em, new protocols 
Em, horizontal cooperation 
Other non-member countries 
Non-member countries- total 
Grand total 
























This  is  the  amount  of capital  still  to  be  repaid  on  a  given  date  in .  respect  of 
operations disbursed (see Table 1). 
Compared with the previous aggregate, the amount outstanding does not include 
loans which have  not yet been  disbursed  nor the  proportion of disbursed  loans 
which have already been ·repaid.  It may be described as the amount ofloans which 
exist on a given date. 
C.  Annual risk 
Estimated amount of  principal and interest due each financial year. 
This amount is calculated for: 
disbursements  alone  (Table 2),  in  which  case  the  capital  to  be  repaid 
corresponds to the amount outstanding~ -68-
disbursejnents, decisions still awaiting disbursement and Commission proposals 
still  awiliting  decisions  {Table 3),  in  which  case  the  capital  to  be  repaid 
. correspbnds  to  the  ceiling  on loans  authorized .  plus. -where  applicable,  the 
amoun~s in  respect ·of operations  proposed  by  the Commission ·and  not yet 
decided.  ·  ·  - · 
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